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ABSTRACT 
This Article examines nationality, transjudicialism, and the 
“war on drugs” as they have played out in extradition proceedings 
around the world.  The judicial decisions explored here are from 
the Privy Council (on appeal from the English-speaking 
Caribbean), the Israeli Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court of 
Canada.  All of the judgments cite the same sources, engage in the 
same analytic process, and are under the same legal influence:  a 
common language that talks about constitutional rights and then 
circles back to a starting point in international relations that 
augments rather than restricts state power.  They also share a 
similar approach to the subject of drug policy and extradition law, 
in that all three national courts are located in states that have 
embraced U.S.-sponsored law enforcement while they at the same 
time have eschewed U.S. jurisprudence as a legal source.  As the 
Article’s title suggests, the theory presented here is that the anti-
drug campaign, with its non-American legal sources harnessed in 
support of American policy, has produced a self-referential legal 
world built on a peculiar form of logic whose circularity is hard to 
escape. 
1.  THE WAR ON LOGIC 
This Article examines nationality,1 transjudicialism,2 and the 
“war on drugs”3 as they have played out in extradition 
 
* Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto.  Many thanks to Ariel 
Bendor, Jutta Brunée, Guy Davidov, Karen Knop, Patrick Macklem, Audrey 
Macklin, Amnon Reichman, Simon Stern, and the participants at the faculty 
workshop at the Hebrew University Faculty of Law for their helpful comments. 
1 The word “nationality” is generally used here in its international law sense 
and “citizenship” in its domestic law sense.  See 7 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS MANUAL, § 1111b (2009) (“While most people and countries use the terms 
‘citizenship’ and ‘nationality’ interchangeably, U.S. law differentiates between the 
two.  Under current law all U.S. citizens are also U.S. nationals, but not all U.S. 
nationals are U.S. citizens.”). 
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proceedings around the world.  As its title suggests, the theory 
presented here is that the anti-drug campaign has produced a self-
referential legal world built on a peculiar form of logic.  The 
judicial decisions explored in this Article are from an assortment of 
national courts,4 but all cite the same sources, engage in the same 
process, and are under the influence of the same substance:5  a 
common language that talks about constitutional rights and then 
circles back to a starting point in international relations that 
augments rather than restricts state power. 
In a pattern that spans three continents,6 extradition, as 
opposed to domestic prosecution, has become the law enforcement 
 
2 For early use of the term as shorthand for the judicial borrowing of foreign 
sources, see Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 
U. RICH. L. REV. 99, 118 (1994).  See also Hanna Buxbaum, From Empire to 
Globalization . . . and Back? A Post-Colonial View of Transjudicialism, 11 IND. J. GLOBAL 
LEG. STUD. 183 (2004); Julian Hermida, A New Model of International Law in National 
Courts: A Transjudicial Vision, 23 WAIKATO L. REV. 3 (2003); Reem Bahdi, 
Globalization of Judgment: Transjudicialism and the Five Faces of International law in 
Domestic Courts, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 555 (2002); Karen Knop, Here and 
There: International Law in Domestic Courts, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 501, 505 
(2000). 
3 The phrase was initially coined by President Richard M. Nixon in a political 
speech in June 1971, identifying drug abuse as “public enemy no. 1” and calling 
for a “war on drugs.”  See Nat’l Pub. Radio, Timeline: America’s War on Drugs 
(Apr. 2, 2007), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId                
= 9252490. 
4 The cases are from the Privy Council on appeal from the Bahamas, the 
Israeli Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court of Canada.  See infra notes 17–19 
and accompanying text. 
5 On the categories of Sources, Process, and Substance as representing the 
doctrinal structure of modern international law, see David Kennedy, Tom Franck 
and the Manhattan School, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 397, 402 (2003) 
(demonstrating a way to organize institutional and doctrinal developments); 
DAVID KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STRUCTURES (1987); Ed Morgan, 
International Law in a Post-Modern Hall of Mirrors, 26 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 207, 210–11 
(1988) (commenting on Kennedy’s division of three distinct doctrines of process, 
sources, and substance). 
6 See Press Release, U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., 3 Defendants Extradited 
from Israel to Stand Trial for Conspiring to Distribute Hundreds of Thousands of 
Ecstasy Pills (Nov. 3, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/ 
states/newsrel/2003/nyc110303.html (explaining that prosecution in United 
States is preferred route for Israeli authorities in combating drug trade); Juan 
Forero, Surge in Extradition of Colombia Drug Suspects to U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 
2004, at A3 (noting that the United States is the destination for South American 
narcotics traffickers); Lloyd Williams, Jamaica, U.S. and Extradition, JAMAICA 
GLEANER, Apr. 8, 2004, available at http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/ 
gleaner/20040408/news/news1.html (finding that the West Indies and the Privy 
Council facilitate drug extraditions to United States). 
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vehicle of choice for governments willing to engage with the 
United States in the anti-drug campaign.7  When it comes to legal 
authority, however, it is not U.S. courts that are looked to for 
guidance, despite the self-image of American courts as being 
“studied with as much in New Delhi or Strasbourg as they are in 
Washington, D.C., or the State of Washington. . . .”8  Instead, the 
courts of countries whose governments have moved toward the 
American view of drug law enforcement9 have eschewed U.S. case 
law and placed others—especially Canadian court decisions10—at 
the forefront of what is sometimes called the transjudicial 
conversation.11 
Why use Canadian jurisprudence in support of American 
policy?  Extradition generally straddles international law and 
constitutional doctrine, and the type of comparative analysis 
described here is often seen as “relevant to the task of interpreting 
 
7 Extradition to the United States has become the next logical step in the 
foreign policy orientation of drug enforcement.  See WILLIAM B. MCALLISTER, DRUG 
DIPLOMACY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY; AN INTERNATIONAL HISTORY 254 (2000) 
(“[I]n the late twentieth century the United States promoted adoption of 
American-style drug control laws in other countries as vigorously as any 
commercial export. . . .”). 
8 Anthony Lester, The Overseas Trade in the American Bill of Rights, 88 COLUM. 
L. REV. 537, 541 (1988). 
9 For discussion of drug policy as cultural phenomenon, see WILLIAM O. 
WALKER III, DRUG CONTROL IN THE AMERICAS, 1 (1989) (explaining that drug use 
has often had ritualistic or religious importance in the social history of America); 
DRUG PROBLEMS IN THE SOCIOCULTURAL CONTEXT: A BASIS FOR POLICIES AND 
PROGRAMME PLANNING (Griffith Edwards & Awni Arif eds., World Health Org. 
1980); William O. Walker III, Introduction: Culture, drugs, and Politics in the 
Americas, in DRUGS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE: AN ODYSSEY OF CULTURES IN 
CONFLICT xv–xxiv (William o. Walker III ed., 1996) (describing how “clashes 
between drug cultures and proponents of drug control traditionally have 
occurred within states”). 
10 See Adam Liptak, U.S. Court, a Longtime Beacon, Is Now Guiding Fewer 
Decisions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2008, at A1 (describing the waning of American 
legal influence in the Canadian Supreme Court). 
11 For an authoritative expression of the aspiration to be at the vanguard of 
the “internationalization of judicial relations,” see Sandra Day O’Connor, Assoc. 
J., U.S. Sup. Ct., Remarks at the Southern Center for International Studies 1, 2, 
available at http://www.southerncenter.org/oconnor_transcript.pdf (Oct. 28, 
2003) (“But conclusions reached by other countries and by the international 
community, although not formally binding upon our decisions, should at times 
constitute persuasive authority in American courts—what is sometimes called 
‘transjudicialism.’”); see also Slaughter, supra note 2, at 112 (defining direct judicial 
dialogue as “communication between two courts that is effectively initiated by 
one and responded to by the other”). 
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constitutions and enforcing human rights.”12  The United States 
Supreme Court, on the other hand, has expressed a well-known 
and much debated antagonism to foreign and comparative law in 
recent years,13 making U.S. judicial pronouncements less popular 
for others as a source of legal ideas.  More than that, it is possible 
that the Supreme Court of Canada has a special place in the 
pantheon of national constitutional courts, in that “Canada, unlike 
the United States, is seen as reflecting an emerging international 
consensus rather than existing as an outlier.”14  This Article aims to 
explore the phenomenon of foreign sources as it has developed 
among countries with a legal affinity to the United States,15 and 
which have actively engaged in the U.S.-led enforcement efforts in 
the war on drugs,16 but have nevertheless chosen to ignore U.S. 
sources of law. 
 
12 Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Hones Merritt, Fifty-First Cardozo 
Memorial Lecture: Affirmative Action: An International Human Rights Dialogue, 21 
CARDOZO L. REV. 253, 282 (1999); see also Vicki C. Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance and 
Comparative Constitutionalism: Opening Up Conversation on “Proportionality,” Rights, 
and Federalism, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 583, 639 (1999) (describing Associate Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor’s opinion that comparativism teaches “the civilizing 
functions of constitutional law”). 
13 For a prominent judicial debate about the use of foreign law, see the 
different perspectives expressed by Justices Kennedy, O’Connor, and Scalia, 
respectively, in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 551, 556, 1206 (2005).  For a review 
of the debate over foreign law more generally, see Daniel Bodansky, The Use of 
International Sources in Constitutional Opinion, 32 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L 421, 423 
(2004) (arguing that there are “strong pragmatic justifications” for taking 
international law into consideration); Joan L. Larsen, Importing Constitutional 
Norms from a “Wider Civilization”: Lawrence and the Rehnquist Court’s Use of Foreign 
and International Law in Domestic Constitutional Interpretation, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1283 
(2004) (arguing there is no adequate theoretical foundation for use of foreign and 
internationl law in domestic law); Gerald L. Neuman, Agora: The United States 
Constitution and International Law: The Uses of International Law in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 82 (2004) (addressing the relevance of international 
law in constitutional interpretation in the past and in the future); Michael D. 
Ramsey, Agora: The United States Constitution and International Law: International 
Materials and Domestic Rights: Reflections on Atkins and Lawrence, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 
69 (2004) (discussing how a “serious” undertaking of utilizing international legal 
materials in constitutional interpretation might operate). 
14 Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of Legal Transplantation, in 
GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 253, 292 (Joseph S. Nye & John D. Donahue 
eds., 2000). 
15 See infra, note 163 and accompanying text. 
16 See MCALLISTER, supra note 7, at 254 (“The dynamic of drug diplomacy 
itself also represents a national security concern entwined with political, 
economic, social, and cultural implications.”); see also William O. Walker III, 
International Collaboration in Historical Perspective, in DRUG POLICY IN THE AMERICAS 
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To that end, this Article examines three prominent 
international drug trafficking cases from three regions or countries 
participating in the anti-narcotics legal campaign: Knowles17 (the 
English-speaking Caribbean), Rosenstein18 (Israel), and Lake19 
(Canada).  While these cases are factually unrelated, all three 
involve extraditions to the United States in furtherance of a 
cooperative narcotics enforcement effort, and all three raise 
constitutional issues about the forcible removal of citizens from 
their country of origin to face trial elsewhere.  In addition, all three 
cases, including the Lake decision by the Supreme Court of 
Canada,20 look not to U.S. courts but to Canadian legal sources in 
interpreting and applying the relevant constitutional norms. 
The other unifying feature of the three otherwise disparate 
cases is that they all—including Lake—seem to misapply or 
misconstrue the Canadian case law from which they draw.21  Each 
decision reverses the usual relationship between citizen and state 
that prior Canadian cases had established: the Privy Council 
refuses to apply due process analysis to extraditions; the Israeli 
Supreme Court uses international law enforcement as a trump card 
for due process and citizenship rights; and the Supreme Court of 
Canada defers to the executive as the authoritative decision-maker 
over the mobility rights of citizens.  The logic deployed by the 
 
265 (Peter H. Smith ed., 1992) (describing four respects in which the Cartagena 
summit between the United States and the presidents of Colombia, Peru, and 
Bolivia offer hope); Chaim Even-Zohar, Drugs in Israel: A Study of Political 
Implications for Society and Foreign Policy, in DRUGS, POLITICS, AND DIPLOMACY: THE 
INTERNATIONAL CONNECTION 186 (Luiz R.S. Simmons & Abdul A. Said eds., 1974). 
17 Knowles v. United States, [2006] UKPC 38 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Bah.) 
(detailing the issue of two extradition requests by the United States to extradite 
Knowles on drug charges). 
18 CrimA 4596/05 Rosenstein v. Israel, [2005] 2 IsrSC 232, para. 1 (involving 
question of extradition to the United States with regard to an Israeli national 
wanted in the United States for conspiracy to import and distribute narcotics in 
the United States). 
19 Lake v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2008] 1 S.C.R. 761, para. 2 (Can.) 
(involving question of extradition to the United States with regard to Canadian 
national convicted of trafficking and sale of crack cocaine in Canada). 
20 Id. para. 49 (dismissing appeal for judicial review of a surrender order 
issued by the Minister of Justice of Canada and upheld by the Ontario Court of 
Appeal in United States v. Lake, [2006] 212 C.C.C. (3d) 51 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.)). 
21 French political theorist Ernst Renan wrote in the 1930s that one essential 
ingredient in the making of a nation is “to get one’s history wrong.”  Ernst Renan, 
What Is A Nation?, in MODERN POLITICAL DOCTRINES 186, 190 (Alfred Zimmern ed., 
1939).  It is equally possible that an essential ingredient in the making of an 
international jurisprudence is to get one’s legal sources wrong. 
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three courts seems at war with linear thinking, with each 
expression of the citizen’s rights folding back on the interests of the 
nation, and each discussion of state power folding back on the 
place of the national in international society. 
The result of all this is an unlikely alliance between, on one 
hand, a jurisprudence that is often considered too interventionist 
for use by American courts,22 and, on the other, long arm U.S. law 
enforcement.  In seemingly climbing aboard what has become a 
policy obsession for the United States,23 foreign courts have pulled 
a contorted Canadian mask over their legal face.  Consequently, 
international relations is disguised as constitutional law,24 or 
interstate cooperation disguised as rights protection.25  Instead of 
 
22 See James Allan et al., The Citation of Overseas Authority in Rights Litigation 
in New Zealand: How Much Bark? How Much Bite?, 11 OTAGO L. REV. 433, 437 (2007) 
(“As Canada’s judges are, by most accounts, the most judicially activist in the 
common law world—the most willing to second-guess the decisions of the elected 
legislatures—reliance on Canadian precedents will worry some and delight 
others.”).  One scholar notes the increase in judicial activism in countries outside 
the United States: 
The trend abroad, moreover, is toward decisions of a distinctly liberal 
sort in areas like the death penalty and gay rights.  “What we have had 
in the last 20 or 30 years,” Professor Fried said, “is an enormous coup 
d’état on the part of judiciaries everywhere – the European Court of 
Human Rights, Canada, South Africa, Israel.”  In terms of judicial 
activism, he said, “they’ve lapped us.” 
Liptak, supra note 10, at A30 (quoting Harvard Law School Professor Charles 
Fried). 
23 See DAVID WAGNER, THE NEW TEMPERANCE: THE AMERICAN OBSESSION WITH 
SIN AND VICE 213 (1997) (citing the war on drugs as an integral part of American 
obsessions with personal behavior).  See also STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS 
OF STREET CRIME: CRIMINAL PROCESS AND CULTURAL OBSESSION 173 (1991) (noting 
the prohibition of illicit drugs as part of the obsessive culture wars in the United 
States). 
24 See, e.g., Jean-Gabriel Castel & Sharon A. Williams, The Extradition of 
Canadian Citizens and Sections I and 6(I) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, 25 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 263, 268-69 (1987) (discussing the necessary 
tensions between extradition as a form of progressive cooperation and the 
influence a nation’s constitutional rights project as a form of retrogressive 
parochialism). 
25 For a description of international cooperation in law enforcement as a 
genre of progressive rights protection, albeit in the different context of illegal 
weapons, see Condoleeza Rice, Op.-Ed., Why We Know Iraq is Lying, N.Y TIMES, 
Jan. 23, 2003, at A25. 
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normative concerns shaping policy,26 the foreign policy of 
cooperative drug enforcement has come to shape legal rights.27 
 To understand how this could happen in the transparent 
world of appellate courts, this Article first takes a detour into 
international law and the place of nationals in the discourse of state 
sovereignty.  It then examines citizenship issues with respect to 
constitutional law generally and drug extraditions in particular, 
before delving into the three decisions at hand. This Article posits 
that by exploring these underpinnings it is possible to come to 
grips with an otherwise perplexing legal phenomenon: the 
apparent misapplication of Canadian constitutional law in pursuit 
of American international law enforcement. 
2.  NATIONALITY RULES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Despite the plethora of U.N.-sponsored, multilateral 
conventions relating to narcotics trafficking,28 drugs have not been 
the focus of much adjudication by international judicial organs.  
The negotiations culminating in the Statute of the International 
 
26 For the now iconic statement of normative principles preceding 
government policy, see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 107 (1977) 
(explaining that a legal decision-maker must “develop a theory of the constitution, 
in the shape of a complex set of principles and policies that justify that scheme of 
government . . .”). 
27 See PETER ANDREAS & ETHAN A. NADELMANN, POLICING THE GLOBE: 
CRIMINALIZATION AND CRIME CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (2006) 
(examining the development of international crime controls as a product of 
Western powers’ domestic systems); Jacob Sullum, Mind Alteration: Drug Policy 
Scholar Ethan Nadelmann on Turning People Against Drug Prohibition, REASON, July 
1, 1994, available at http://www.thefreelibrary.com/_/print/PrintArticle. 
aspx?id=16075326 (observing that “[t]he roles that communism and drugs have 
played in American politics are quite similar”). 
28 See U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances, opened for signature Dec. 20, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 497 (entered 
into force Nov. 11, 1990) (creating uniform prohibitions against the illicit 
trafficking of narcotic and psychotropic drugs within the international 
community); Convention on Psychotropic Substances, opened for signature Feb. 21, 
1971, 10 I.L.M. 261 (entered into force Aug. 16, 1976) (discussing standards for use, 
trade, and research of psychotropic substances in the international community); 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, opened for signature Mar. 30, 1961, 976 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Single Convention] (entered into force Dec. 13, 1964) (as 
amended by Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, 
Mar. 5, 1972, 976 U.N.T.S. 3, 11 I.L.M. 804) (aiming to control production of raw 
materials of narcotic drugs within the international community). 
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Criminal Court29 raised the possibility of categorizing drug 
trafficking as an international offense; however, the sessions 
concluded only with a resolution that the state parties consider 
including it at a future review conference.30  Although drug policy 
plays a central role in international legal discourse31 and the United 
Nations monitors narcotics treaty implementation by its member 
states,32 actual enforcement and prosecution has been left to the 
unilateral and coordinated actions of domestic legal systems.  
By contrast, the concept of nationality—a central ingredient in 
the drug trafficking cases and in legal modernism generally33—has 
been the subject of much international deliberation.34  Traditional 
 
29 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.138/9, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 999 (July 1, 2002) (establishing the International 
Criminal Court by agreement among countries party to the U.N.). 
30 See generally U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/13 
(July 17, 1998) (providing background information on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, including the statute itself, relevant General 
Assembly resolutions, summary of meetings, reports, documents of the plenary, 
etc.). 
31 See U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], Evolution of International 
Drug Control, 51 BULL. NARCOTICS 1, 1–2 (1999) (prepared by I. Bayer & H. Ghodse) 
(discussing the historical evolution of drug abuse as a global problem and the 
subsequent international responses).  See also LYAL S. SUNGA, THE EMERGING 
SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: DEVELOPMENTS IN CODIFICATION AND 
IMPLEMENTATION 216 (1997) (“[T]he proliferation of international agreements 
designed to suppress trafficking in illicit drugs indicates that the international 
community has recognized the need for international rather than purely domestic 
solutions to the drug problem.”). 
32 See International Narcotics Control Board, Mandate and Functions, 
http://www.incb.org/incb/mandate.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2009) (explaining 
that one of the functions of the Board is to identify “weaknesses in national and 
international control systems [for illicit drugs] and contributes to correcting such 
situations”). 
33 On the liberal value base of modern international law, see David Kennedy, 
When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the Box, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 335 
(2000) (presenting international law as the product of professional vocabulary and 
performances, rather than the product of doctrines and institutions); Mary Ellen 
O’Connell, New International Legal Process, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 334 (1999) (discussing 
policy-oriented jurisprudence and its global values and social aspirations); Anne-
Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual 
Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 205 (1993) (analyzing the evolution of international law 
and the resulting institutionalist and liberal agendas that shape international law 
today). On the liberal structure of international law generally, see David Kennedy, 
Theses About International Law Discourse, 23 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 353 (1980). 
34 For a recent example, see Press Release, Grassley Targets International 
Drug Traffickers, (July 29, 2008), available at http://grassley.senate.gov/news 
/Article.cfm?customel_dataPageID_1502=15740 (discussing the introduction by 
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international thinking held, as the title of this part of the Article 
suggests, that nationality rules,35 so that only the parent sovereign 
could make a claim of right on behalf of its individual nationals.36  
Of course, states have always been considered competent to confer 
rights on persons within their scope,37 but the classical perception 
of individuals by international lawyers has been that the citizenry 
is a medium for, not a restraint on, state power.38  Thus, for 
example, the extra-territorial protection of one’s own citizens has 
been considered within a sovereign’s jurisdictional capacity rather 
than an incursion into a foreign state.39  Likewise, a state could 
claim breach of its international rights where another has 
mistreated its national,40 even where the identical acts aimed at the 
 
Senators Chuck Grassley, Joe Biden and Dianne Feinstein of Drug Trafficking 
Interdiction Assistance Act, S. 3351, addressing the issue of maritime drug 
trafficking by persons and vessels not identified by nationality). 
35 See Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State “Sovereignty”, 25 GA. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 31, 37-38 (1995) (ruling out both convention and custom as traditional 
sources for contemporary human rights law); Anthony D’Amato, Human Rights as 
Part of Customary International Law: A Plea for a Change of Paradigms, 25 GA. J. INT’L 
& COMP. L. 47, 47 (1995) (noting that “[p]rior to 1945 a government would not be 
deemed to have violated international law by the mass murder of its own citizens 
in its own territory.”). 
36 See U.N. Charter Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 34, para. 1, 
59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993 (1945) (“Only states may be parties in cases before the 
Court”); Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4, 39 
(Feb. 5) (noting only a state in which a corporate entity is registered has standing 
to assert a claim on that corporation’s behalf).  The theme of international law and 
nationality rules is discussed more thoroughly in: Edward Morgan & Ofer Attias, 
Rabbi Kahane, International Law, and the Courts: Democracy Stands on its Head, 4 
TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 185 (1990). 
37 See HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE COLLECTED PAPERS  
469-71 (Elihu Lauterpacht ed., 1970) (explaining that individuals hold 
international legal rights solely by virtue of the intention of state parties through 
conventions or by incorporating international law into domestic law). 
38 Much as when the individual is associated not with a state but with the 
United Nations, the “citizen” becomes a medium of institutional rights and 
power. See Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 
Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174 (Apr. 11). 
39 See, e.g., S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (holding that 
Turkish jurisdiction on behalf of its nationals justifies jurisdictional incursion into 
French ship); United States v. Yunis, 859 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that 
international law allows for passive personality criminal jurisdiction). 
40 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. Gr. Brit.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. 
A) No. 2 (holding that injury to an alien national is an injury to the alien’s parent 
state). 
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foreign state’s own citizen would offend no domestic norm.41  The 
idea was that through their nationals, states could create and 
expand their presence,42 and were empowered and endowed with 
rights in a world of nations.43 
On the other side of the coin, the concept of nationality has also 
played an important role in restraining state power.  While a state 
may gain rights through its nationals, it delineates the borders of 
its own legal rights by logical extension.44  Thus, for example, a 
state’s inherent legal jurisdiction has always fallen short of 
governing the nationals of a foreign state located within their own 
state,45 notwithstanding the possibility of extraterritorial 
legislation.46  Through nationality, states define and enforce their 
 
41 See B. E. Chattin (U.S.) v. United Mexican States (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R. Int’l 
Arb. Awards 282 (Gen. Cl. Comm’n 1927) (reporting that the United States 
claimed denial of due process by Mexican authorities towards American citizen 
arrested in Mexico even though due process was not recognized under Mexican 
law); Editorial Comment on Report Presented by the Commission of Jurists on 
Interpretations of the League of Nations Covenant and Points of General International 
Law of Unusual Interest, League of Nations (1934), reprinted in Quincy Wright, 
Opinion of Commission of Jurists on Janina-Corfu Affair, 18 AM. J. INT’L L. 536, 543 
(1924) (“The recognized public character of a foreigner and the circumstances in 
which he is present in its territory entail upon the State a corresponding duty of 
special vigilance on his behalf.”). 
42 See Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Mich., 333 U.S. 28 (1948) (holding that the 
presence of U.S. nationals gives state jurisdiction over events in foreign territory). 
43 See In the Matter of a Reference as to Whether Members of the Military or 
Naval Forces of the United States of America are Exempt From Criminal 
Proceedings in Canadian Criminal Courts,  [1943] S.C.R. 483 (Can.) (holding that 
the U.S. had criminal jurisdiction over troops stationed on base in Canadian 
territory). 
44 See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 
1980 I.C.J. 51 (May 24) (holding that Iranian authority ends where U.S. authority 
begins). 
45 In the United States, this notion was reversed with the rediscovery of the 
Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350. See Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 
(2d Cir. 1980) (allowing jurisdiction over an alien tort claim brought by an alleged 
Paraguayan torture victim of the Paraguayan Inspector-General of the police). 
46 See, e.g., Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., Ltd., 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 
1956) (holding that the Lanham Trade-Mark Act does not apply to trademark 
infringement by a Canadian corporation in Canada despite its potentially 
extraterritorial application to United States companies). 
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collective differences;47 and these differences effectively restrain 
the acts of other states.48 
One implication of the empowering and restraining effect of 
nationality in international discourse is that while states cannot 
wrongly impinge on the nationals of another, they have been at 
liberty as sovereigns to define the scope of their own citizenry.  The 
seminal statement of this principle was in the Nationality Decrees 
case.49  The British government objected to French nationality 
decrees in its North African colonies on persons who, under 
English law, were British subjects.  The Permanent Court of 
International Justice’s answer was that international relations 
required states to be at liberty to fashion their own nationality 
rules.50  Thus, the court supported unrestrained sovereignty with 
respect to French nationality laws,51 while it admonished France 
for having violated a treaty obligation toward Britain to respect 
British interests in the region.52 
In sum, Nationality Decrees demonstrates that the concept can 
point to either state empowerment or state restraint.  The 
jurisprudence of international tribunals seems to invoke both 
positions.53  Perhaps the starkest illustration of this rhetorical 
 
47 See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (holding 
that a Mexican national arrested and brought to the United States for trial lacks 
constitutional rights against wrongful arrest since “the people” as used in Fourth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution refers to people of the United States). 
48 See, e.g., Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812) 
(upholding the absolute theory of sovereign immunity by holding that the host 
state’s interference with the foreign public armed ship cannot occur without 
affecting its power and dignity; thus, the ship enjoys exemption from host 
sovereign’s jurisdiction while within host territory). 
49 See Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco, Advisory Opinion, 
1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 4 (Feb. 7) (articulating the idea that states are free to 
define its citizenry). 
50 The court reasoned that questions of domestic jurisdiction pose “an 
essentially relative question; it depends upon the development of international 
relations.” Id. at 24. 
51 Id. 
52 In the court’s view, the generally applicable international legal principle is 
one of the sovereign freedom, while the particular legal policy to which France is 
bound is one of restraint vis-à-vis Britain as its treaty partner.  “For the purpose of 
the present opinion, it is enough to observe that it may well happen that, in a 
matter which, like that of nationality, is not, in principle, regulated by 
international law, the right of a State to use its direction is nevertheless restricted 
by obligations which it may have undertaken towards other States.”  Id. 
53 In a theme that harks back to the interplay between naturalist and 
positivist theories of law seen in Paquete Habana, the nationality cases highlight 
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phenomenon is provided by the International Court of Justice’s 
decision in the Nottebohm Case,54 in which Liechtenstein alleged 
mistreatment of one of its nationals by the authorities of his 
country of residence, Guatemala.55  Guatemala successfully 
challenged “the admissibility of the claim related to the nationality 
of the person for whose protection Liechtenstein had seised the 
Court. . . .”56  The legal focus in Nottebohm effectively shifted from 
Guatemala’s treatment of the individual to Liechtenstein’s 
connection to its citizen.  Guatemala attacked the relatively lax 
Liechtensteinian laws under which Nottebohm had acquired 
citizenship.57  On the theoretical plane, the pattern of legal 
arguments all but revealed the dual nature of nationality norms 
and international legality: the substantive rights and wrongs of 
international law were inextricably tied to the process of state 
participation in international matters.  It was difficult for the court 
to judge sovereign actions without speculating as to the nature of 
the relationships between state actors operating within a legally 
sovereign system.58 
 
international law’s need to cast what might appear to be a natural restraint on 
sovereign states in positive law terms. See Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).  
Thus, sovereigns are limited in their actions in a way, which accentuates every 
sovereign’s unlimited ability to consent to international limitations. See supra 
notes 34–37 and accompanying text; Edward Morgan, Criminal Process, 
International Law and Extraterritorial Crime, 38 U. TORONTO L.J. 245, 253 (1988) 
(stating that international case law is “permeated by various rhetorical techniques 
in which states are told what they should be doing simply by being told what they 
actually do.”). 
54 Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6). 
55 Liechtenstein’s request to the International Court of Justice was for the 
international body to adjudge and declare that “[t]he Government of Guatemala 
in arresting, detaining, expelling and refusing to readmit Mr. Nottebohm and in 
seizing and retaining his property without compensation acted in breach of their 
obligations under international law.”  Id. at 6–7. 
56 Id. at 12. 
57 The court summarized the Liechtensteinian law regarding the 
naturalization of foreigners (under which Mr. Nottebohm had acquired 
Liechtensteinian nationality) as one which allowed most of the typical residency 
and other requirements to “be dispensed with in circumstances deserving special 
consideration and by way of exception.”  Id. at 14. Thus, the only mandatory 
criterion to which the non-resident candidate for naturalization had to conform 
was the submission of “proof that he has concluded an agreement with the 
Revenue authorities . . . [and] the payment by the applicant of a naturalization 
fee.”  Id. 
58 For a thorough discussion of the curiously separate yet connected 
categories of international substance and process, see DAVID KENNEDY, 
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The ruling in Nottebohm contained an interesting double edge.  
It managed to uphold Liechtenstein’s citizenship law and to 
undermine Liechtenstein’s standing to bring the claim.  In its 
central passage, the judgment reasserted the fundamental rule of 
freedom that had been the starting point of the Nationality Decrees 
case: “It is for . . . every sovereign State to settle by its own 
legislation the rules relating to the acquisition of its 
nationality. . . .”59  In the first instance, the court was prompted by 
a desire to assert even the nonconforming state’s sovereign power 
to define its own nationality.60  Immediately following this, 
however, the court asserted that “the issue which the Court must 
decide is not one which pertains to the legal system of 
Liechtenstein. . . .  It is international law which determines whether 
a State is entitled to exercise protection and to seise the Court.”61  
Thus, the court simultaneously championed the cause of 
international legality over the domestic laws of the deviant state. 
Given the generally defensive tone of classical international 
pronouncements, the court’s assertion of its own process rules over 
the laws of Liechtenstein represents an assertive moment for 
international jurisprudence.62  On the other hand, it did little more 
than to reintroduce, with a twist, the traditional international law 
ambivalence.  In Nottebohm, international law seemed to actively 
override state power in its assessment of Liechtenstein’s standing, 
and to remain passive in its non-assessment of Guatemala’s 
treatment of its resident.  If the result restricted sovereignty, it did 
so in a way which repeated the theme of the Nationality Decrees 
 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STRUCTURES (1987) (describing the discursive structure of 
public international law). 
59 Nottebohm, 1955 I.C.J. at 20. 
60 The customary law on point was described as follows: “According to the 
practice of States, to arbitral and judicial decisions and to the opinions of writers, 
nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine 
connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence of 
reciprocal rights and duties.”  Id. at 23. Evidently, Mr. Nottebohm’s connection 
with Liechtenstein was perceived as lacking the requisite level of intimacy. 
61 Id. at 20–21. 
62 The court stated emphatically that “[i]t does not depend on the law or on 
the decision of Liechtenstein whether that State is entitled to exercise its 
protection [in international adjudication].”  Id. at 20.  As if to tone down its 
assertiveness, the court then re-characterized its own decision as a matter of mere 
factual assessment.  The decision, therefore, holds that in cases of disputed 
citizenship, “the real and effective nationality [is preferred], that which accorded 
with the facts, that based on stronger factual ties between the person concerned 
and one of the States whose nationality is involved.”  Id. at 22. 
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judgment—the denial of one nation’s standing effectively 
empowering another nation (and all nations). 
The lesson of international law’s nationality cases, therefore, is 
that sovereigns may appear to be restrained in the name of 
individuals and a superior normative force, but the cases are 
equally explicable as articulating sovereign restraint only in the 
name of sovereignty itself.  Notwithstanding that nationality 
questions frequently have arisen in contexts which pose questions 
of aliens’ rights, the theme of individuals against state power is 
typically discernible only as a partial and subordinate aspect of 
these controversies.  The primary emphasis has traditionally been 
one which allows sovereigns to assert their powers in delineating 
their own constituencies up until the point where they impinge the 
legal personality of another equal sovereign.63 
For illustration of the point that nationality stands as much 
with sovereignty as against it, one need only examine the historic 
cases raising questions of alien’s rights.  In the famous Roberts 
Claim,64 the United States sought damages against Mexico for the 
inhumane conditions which Roberts, a United States citizen, 
suffered during his eighteen months awaiting trial in a Mexican 
prison.  The fundamental question, which seems at first to 
distinguish this adjudication from other international controversies 
of the era, was whether the treatment of Roberts violated an 
international norm with respect to aliens despite Mexico’s having 
acted within its rightful domestic jurisdiction.65 
The tribunal’s opinion started out sounding like a precursor to 
the fully developed human rights law of a later era, asserting that 
 
63 See Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812) 
(recognizing that the world is “composed of distinct sovereignties possessing 
equal rights and equal independence”). 
64 Harry Roberts (U.S. v. Mex.) 4 R. INT’L ARB AWARDS 77 (1926), reprinted in 
21 AM. J. INT’L L. 357 (1927) [hereinafter Roberts].  See also J. W. Garner, Decisions of 
the American-Mexican Mixed Claims Commissions, 8 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 179, 184 (1927) 
(summarizing the case of Roberts). 
65 The case was adjudicated by the U.S.-Mexico General Claims Commission, 
established under the Convention for Reciprocal Settlement of Claims, U.S.-Mex., 
Sept. 8, 1923, 43 Stat. 1730, T.S. No. 678.  Regarding the initial arrest, the 
Commission indicated that “[i]n the light of the evidence presented in the case the 
Commission is of the opinion that the Mexican authorities had ample grounds to 
suspect that Harry Roberts had committed a crime and to proceed against him as 
they did.”  Roberts, supra note 64, at 359. 
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Roberts enjoyed a right to humane prison conditions.66  
Nevertheless, the question of whether this right was attributable to, 
or stood against, state sovereignty was subtly answered with a 
“yes” and a “no.”  The Commission characterized the conditions of 
Roberts’ captivity as depressingly substandard and articulated a 
universal test of “whether aliens are treated in accordance with 
ordinary standards of civilization.”67  The judgment seemed to 
imply, almost anachronistically, that Roberts’ prison conditions 
were inhumane regardless of his nationality.  In this view, the 
individual claimant was attributed rights against any state, foreign 
or domestic, which so degrades his humanity. 
That said, the tribunal proceeded to describe the Mexican 
offense in a way that distinguished the foreigner from his cell-
mates.  The tribunal stressed that Roberts was made to share a 
toilet and prison cell only “thirty-five feet long and twenty feet 
wide” with, at times, “thirty or forty [Mexican] men.”68  The crucial 
point, of course, was that Roberts and his cell-mates were 
normatively unequal.  The holder of international rights was, in 
classic international law style, identified on the basis of his 
representative capacity as a member of a foreign nation.  The 
domestic prisoners belonged to the imprisoning nation, and 
therefore had to find their rights, if any, in Mexican law; contrarily, 
the alien prisoner belonged, by definition, to a foreign nation with 
international legal rights of its own. 
While the upshot of the case law is that citizenship and 
alienage can protect persons against the acts of nations,69 the 
thematic undercurrent is that nationality represents a sense of 
belonging to a given nation.70  Aliens and nationals can be 
significant in international law as persons,71 but their significance 
derives primarily from the fact that they have been perceived as 
 
66 In the Commission’s words, “We do not hesitate to say that the treatment 
of Roberts was such as to warrant an indemnity on the ground of cruel and 
inhumane imprisonment.”  Roberts, supra note 64, at 361. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 360. 
69 For a classic statement, see HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND 
STATE 234–35 (Transaction Publishers 2006) (1945). 
70 See EUROPEAN OPINION RESEARCH GROUP, CITIZENSHIP AND SENSE OF 
BELONGING (2004), available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs 
/ebs_199.pdf. 
71 See, e.g., Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) (holding that Spanish fishing 
vessels are exempt from capture as prize of war). 
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individual appendages of their parent nations.72  Correspondingly, 
states are both empowered in the delineation and treatment of 
their nationals,73 and restrained in their impact on alien nationals.74  
Nationals are linked to their sovereign state, the point of their 
rights being in the first instance that they are not linked to some 
other sovereign state with nationals of its own.75 
3. CITIZENSHIP RULES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Nationality plays a similarly ambiguous role in the domestic 
legal system,76 although in modern constitutional law it may be 
said—again, as the title of this part of the Article suggests—that 
citizenship rules.77  As in international discourse, domestic contests 
 
72 This is as true for corporate citizens as for natural ones. See generally 
Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4 (Feb. 5) 
(noting only a state in which a corporate entity is registered has standing to assert 
a claim on that corporation’s behalf); Rosalyn Higgins, Aspects of the Case 
Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd., 11 VA. J. INT. L. 
327 (1971) (contemplating who or what has a cause of action with respect to 
damages sustained by shareholders, resulting from unlawful treatment of the 
company); Herbert W. Briggs, Barcelona Traction: The Jus Standi of Belgium, 65 AM. 
J. INT’L. L. 327 (1971) (commenting on the jus standi of Beldium); Brian Flemming, 
Note, Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited, 
Preliminary Objections, 3 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 306 (1965) (analyzing the preliminary 
objections put forward by Spain). 
73 For a full discussion, see Peter J. Spiro, Mandated Membership, Diluted 
Identity: Citizenship, Globalization, and International Law, in PEOPLE OUT OF PLACE: 
GLOBALIZATION, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE CITIZENSHIP GAP 87 (Alison Brysk & 
Gershon Shafir eds., 2004). 
74 See, e.g., S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 4 (holding that Turkey 
free to try ship captain for injury to Turkish sailors by acts done on board French 
ship). 
75 The issue comes to the fore with respect to dual nationals. See generally, 
MOHSEN AGHAHOSSEINI, CLAIMS OF DUAL NATIONALS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007) (discussing the controversy surrounding 
the question of whether a dual national may state a claim against one of her States 
of nationality); Peter J. Spiro, Dual Nationality and the Meaning of Citizenship, 46 
EMORY L.J. 1411 (1997) (tracing the evolution of the discourse surrounding dual 
nationality). 
76 For a review of the ambiguity of nationality and alienage in legal 
discourse, see Edward M. Morgan, Aliens and Process Rights: The Open and Shut 
Case of Legal Sovereignty, 7 WIS. INT’L L.J. 107 (1989).  On some distinctions between 
nationality and citizenship, see Mohammed Saif-Alden Wattad, Resurrecting 
“Romantics at War:” International Self-Defense in the Shadow of the Law of War—
Where Are the Borders?, 13 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 205 (2006). 
77 See British Nationality Act, 1981, c. 61, § 1 (U.K.) (modifying territorial 
basis for birthright citizenship by including parentage qualifications); United 
States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) (stating that the Fourteenth 
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over nationality commence with an understanding that citizenship 
is a badge of inclusion in the polity.  Accordingly, most disputes 
over citizenship entail questions about its relinquishment.78  In 
particular, courts in the United States have focused their attention 
on the naturalization process,79 and have asked the question of 
whether the citizen has either voluntarily or implicitly 
“expatriated” herself.80 
The United States inherited its attitudes towards citizenship 
from the English common law, which held nationality to be an 
 
Amendment conveys constitutional right of citizenship to all persons born in 
territorial United States); Calvin’s Case, (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B.) (outlining 
the basis for birthright citizenship in U.K. under English common law); Jonathan 
C. Drimmer, The Nephews of Uncle Sam: The History, Evolution, and Application of 
Birthright Citizenship in the United States, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 667, 671 (1995) (noting 
the legal status of children of illegal immigrants born in the U.S. is “uncertain”); 
see also Dan Stein & John Bauer, Interpreting the 14th Amendment: Automatic 
Citizenship for Children of Illegal Immigrants?, 7 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 127, 128 (1996) 
(noting neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor the U.S. Constitution has directly 
addressed the question whether children of illegal immigrants are citizens).  
Modern constitutional law analysis shows citizenship is given priority over 
territorial-based nationality in the domestic legal system.  See generally Michael 
Robert W. Houston, Note, Birthright Citizenship in the United Kingdom and the 
United States: A Comparative Analysis of the Common Law Basis for Granting 
Citizenship to Children Born of Illegal Immigrants, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 693 
(2000) (discussing the common law concept of territorial birthright citizenship and 
the shift in contemporary discourse from its common law basis to whether 
citizenship ought to inhere in children born to illegal immigrants); Andrew 
Grossman, Birthright Citizenship as Nationality of Convenience, in PROCEEDINGS, 
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, THIRD CONF. ON NATIONALITY, STRASBOURG, at 109–21 (2004).  
For the relevant European jurisprudence on birthright citizenship, see Case C-
200/02, Kunqia Catherine Zhu & Man Lavette Chen v. Sec’y of State for Home 
Dep’t, 2004 E.C.R. I-09925.  See also Citizenship Amendment Act 2005, 2005 S.R. 
No. 43 (N.Z.) (establishing that birthright citizenship is attained where one parent 
is a New Zealand citizen); Citizenship Act, R.S.C., ch. C-29, § 3(1)(a) (1985) (Can.) 
(outlining birthright citizenship for persons born in Canada). 
78 For a general discussion of the ways in which U.S. citizenship can be lost, 
see GLADSON I. NWANNA, AMERICANS LIVING ABROAD: WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW 
WHILE YOU ARE THERE 79 (2004) (discussing citizenship and nationality issues for 
expatriates).  For an official Canadian publication, see CITIZENSHIP AND 
IMMIGRATION CANADA, ACQUISITION AND LOSS OF CANADIAN CITIZENSHIP (2009), 
available at http://www.cic.gc.ca/EnGLish/resources/manuals/cp/cp09-eng.pdf. 
79 For a general history of the nationalization process in U.S. law, see J.P 
Jones, Comment, Limiting Congressional Denationalization After Afroyim, 17 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 121 (1979). 
80 See Richard R. Gray, Comment, Expatriation—A Concept in Need of 
Clarification, 8 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 375, 379–87 (1975) (analyzing the confusing 
expatriation law in the U.S. by exploring its historical sources, its present 
manifestations, and a conceptual approach that could eliminate it). 
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immutable feature of human nature.81  This sentiment found 
expression in the U.S. Declaration of Independence and the early 
Federalists argued for governmental confirmation of this 
entrenched right.82  The notion of U.S. citizenship as a right was 
then supplemented in the mid-nineteenth century by a statutory 
guarantee to U.S. citizens of the right to expatriate themselves.83  It 
was not until the early twentieth century that American federal 
legislation identified acts that could result in the involuntary 
relinquishment of citizenship.84  This method of denationalization 
by implied expatriation has been the governing norm of American 
law since that time.85 
Citizenship as a legal badge of national inclusion was a 
continuous feature of U.S. enactments until at least the 1950s,86 
reaching its high point in the Expatriation Act of 1954.87  Under 
that legislation, a U.S. national could lose her status by serving in 
the armed forces of a foreign sovereign state,88 voting in a foreign 
state’s election,89 taking employment or holding public office in a 
 
81 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *370 (noting that no person is “able 
at pleasure to unloose those bonds, by which he is connected to his natural 
prince”). 
82 See generally CHARLES GORDON & HARRY N. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW 
AND PROCEDURE (1959). 
83 See generally Expatriation Act of 1868, ch. 249, 15 Stat. 223 (“Whereas the 
right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all people, indispensable to 
the enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness . . . any 
declaration, instruction, opinion, order, or decision of any officers of the this 
government which denies, restricts, impairs, or questions the right of expatriation, 
is hereby declared inconsistent with the fundamental principles of this 
government.”). 
84 See generally Expatriation Act of 1907, ch. 2534, 34 Stat. 1228 (stating that 
any American citizen has expatriated himself when he has been naturalized in any 
foreign state or taken an oath of allegiance to any foreign state, while any 
naturalized citizen expatriates himself if he has “resided for two years in the 
foreign state from which he came, or for five years in any other foreign state.”). 
85 See generally Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 401, 54 Stat. 1137, 1168 (re-
enacted as Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163, 267, § 
349 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (1982)). 
86 See Expatriation Act of 1907, ch. 2534, 34 Stat. 1228, § 3 (providing as an 
example of early gender discriminatory ground for expatriation, an American 
woman marrying a foreign man as grounds for losing U.S. citizenship). 
87 See Expatriation Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 772, ch. 1256, 68 Stat. 808 
(amending Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) 
(1982)). 
88 8 U.S.C.  § 1481(a)(3). 
89 Id. § 1481(a)(5). 
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foreign government,90 becoming a naturalized citizen of a foreign 
state,91 or even residing for three years in a country in which she 
holds dual citizenship by birth.92  Various other voluntary acts, 
which while falling short of explicit renunciation of citizenship93 
were nevertheless deemed contrary to the duties of citizenship, 
could likewise result in the revocation of U.S. citizenship.  These 
voluntary acts included desertion from the U.S. military,94 avoiding 
compulsory military service,95 or committing acts of treason 
against the United States.96  Formally, it was the Congressional 
power to regulate foreign affairs that grounded the legislatively 
defined expatriations,97 but the normative thrust of the citizenship 
policy was inward rather than outward looking.  The idea behind 
defining specific acts of self-exclusion was to give practical 
meaning to citizenship as a symbol of inclusion. 
The power to enact expatriation rules and to thereby define the 
American polity was initially upheld as an extension of 
Congressional authority over foreign affairs rather than over any 
area of domestic policy.98  In Perez v. Brownell, the Supreme Court 
overrode the dissenting objections voiced by Chief Justice 
Warren,99 and found an identifiable link between prohibiting U.S. 
citizens from voting in foreign elections and avoiding any 
embarrassment of the U.S. government or conflict with foreign 
nations.100  At the same time, the Court put restrictions on this 
 
90 Id. § 1481(a)(4). 
91 Id. § 1481(a)(1).  Becoming a dual national may or may not include the 
alternative grounds for expatriation for swearing allegiance to a foreign 
sovereign.  Id. at § 1481(a)(2). 
92 Id. § 1481. 
93 Id. § 1481(a)(6) (addressing formal renunciation of citizenship). 
94 Id. § 1481(a)(9). 
95 Id. § 1481(a)(10). 
96 Id. § 1481(a)(8). 
97 See Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958) (addressing expatriation due to 
avoiding the draft and voting in foreign election). 
98 Id. at 57 (discussing the expatriation resulting from U.S. citizens voting in a 
foreign election). 
99 Id. at 66 (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (“Under our form of government, as 
established by the Constitution, the citizenship of the lawfully naturalized and the 
native-born cannot be taken from them.”). 
100 Id.  
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power, opining in Trop v. Dulles101 that a deserter from the U.S. 
military could not be stripped of his citizenship, because using 
denaturalization as a criminal sanction was considered “cruel and 
unusual punishment” and contrary to the Eighth Amendment.102 
Congressional and executive authority over expatriation was 
further eroded in Nishikawa v. Dulles,103 where the Court made it 
clear that any doubt about the voluntariness of the expatriating act 
must fall to the benefit of the citizen wishing to maintain his 
status.104  The 1950s therefore ended with a weakened, but 
nevertheless intact notion that citizenship—and the corresponding 
congressional authority to define the terms on which 
naturalization and denaturalization occur—is congruent with the 
inclusive meaning attached to nationality by the International 
Court of Justice in the Nottebohm Case.105  In determining the actual 
import of congressionally defined expatriating acts, the U.S. courts 
continued to give practical application to the international 
requirement to determine “real and effective nationality.”106 
A separation of U.S. thinking from international opinion on 
nationality as a legal concept came toward the end of the 1960s in 
Afroyim v. Rusk.107  Revisiting a factual scenario almost identical to 
the one in Perez, the Supreme Court concluded that the act of 
voting in a foreign election could not form the basis of 
denationalization absent some evidence of the U.S. citizen’s 
consent to the expatriation.108  This time around, the majority 
 
101 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (deciding that stripping military 
deserters of their citizenship was unconstitutional).  The decision in Trop was 
rendered the same day as the decision in Perez. 
102 Id. at 99–101. 
103 Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958) (reinstating citizenship for U.S.-
born dual citizens who were involuntarily inducted into the Japanese army 
during the Second World War). 
104 Id. at 136.  For an earlier version of a similar analysis, see Perkins v. Elg, 
307 U.S. 325, 337 (1939) (opining that the “[r]ights of citizenship are not to be 
destroyed by an ambiguity”). 
105 Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6) (deciding that 
nationality depends on the strength of an individual’s ties to the nation of which 
he is claiming nationality). 
106 Id. at 22. 
107 Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967) (deciding that unless a U.S. citizen 
consented to expatriation, citizenship could not be revoked as a consequence of 
voting in a foreign election). 
108 Id. at 255 (describing how Afroyim was a dual U.S.-Israeli national whose 
U.S. citizenship had been revoked when he voted in an Israeli election). 
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picked up a strand that had been expressed by Chief Justice 
Warren in the minority a decade earlier; the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s expression of birthright nationality has the effect of 
“defining a citizenship which a citizen keeps unless he voluntarily 
relinquishes it.”109  The thrust of the Afroyim decision, therefore, 
was to convert nationality discourse into rights discourse, making 
what had been a badge of inclusion in the polity into a legal 
bulwark against the polity’s excesses.110  In the Supreme Court’s 
words, each citizen has a “constitutional right to remain a citizen in 
a free country unless he voluntarily relinquishes that 
citizenship.”111 
Following Afroyim, Congress amended the governing 
legislation to eliminate those expatriating acts—foreign voting, 
desertion, and evasion of military service112—that had been 
declared unconstitutional.  Thus, by the end of the 1960s, the Act 
provided that the taking of an oath of allegiance to a foreign 
sovereign government, joining a foreign armed forces or holding 
office in a foreign state were virtually the only ways, short of a 
formal renouncing of citizenship, that denationalization of an 
American-born citizen could occur.113  The one legislative question 
that Afroyim left unanswered,114 and the one power that Congress 
continued to wield against those it deemed wayward citizens, was 
the ability to infer from the expatriating act that the citizen had 
consented to the loss of nationality, albeit without saying so.115  The 
 
109 Id. at 262. 
110 See, e.g., Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915) (highlighting how in the 
early part of the twentieth century, subjective intent, or personal choice, was not 
necessary for denationalization to occur). 
111  Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 268.  But see Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971) 
(rejecting the notion of a constitutional right for American citizens born abroad to 
remain a citizen unless voluntarily relinquishing citizenship). 
112 See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (holding that it 
was unconstitutional for a statute to divest an American of his citizenship for 
evading military service by leaving or remaining outside U.S. territory during 
wartime). 
113 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (1952) (referencing the loss of nationality by native-born 
or naturalized citizens through voluntary action, the burden of proof required and 
presumptions). 
114 See, e.g., Lawrence Abramson, United States Loss of Citizenship Law After 
Terrazas: Decisions of the Board of Appellate Review, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT’L. L. & POL. 829, 
835 (1984) (describing how at the time of Afroyim, the law on inferred consent to 
denationalization “seemed to be in a state of flux”). 
115 For an exploration of this caveat to the Afroyim ruling, see J.P. Jones, 
Comment, Limiting Congressional Denationalization After Afroyim, 17 SAN DIEGO L. 
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deemed intent power was, in effect, the last defense of the position 
that it is the government as institutional embodiment of the 
society, and not the citizen as an individual member of that society, 
that ultimately demarcates who falls inside or outside of the 
nation. 
The issue came to a head in Vance v. Terrazas,116 where a dual 
U.S.-Mexican national swore an oath of allegiance to Mexico and 
consequently found his American citizenship revoked.117  In an 
effort to clarify once and for all the issue of voluntariness, the 
Supreme Court declared that the government bears the “burden of 
proof that the expatriating act was performed with the necessary 
intent to relinquish citizenship.”118  Within a few years of this 
ruling, the administrative tribunals and federal courts 
implementing the expatriating rules looked only for criteria that 
“would render it impossible for [the citizen] to perform the 
obligations of U.S. citizenship.”119  Thus, Rabbi Meir Kahane was 
found not to have intended his own expatriation when he ran for 
election and took an oath of office as a member of the Israeli 
Knesset.120  Likewise, Laurence Terrazas himself was found not to 
have undertaken a voluntary expatriation, despite having sworn 
an oath containing an express denunciation of his U.S. 
citizenship.121 
As a result, a citizen can engage in self-contradiction and even 
blatant hypocrisy and still remain a citizen.122  The U.S. case law on 
 
REV. 121, 138 (1980).  But see United States v. Matheson, 532 F.2d 809 (1976) 
(asserting that Afroyim required the government to provide proof of the citizen’s 
specific intent). 
116 Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980) (deciding that the burden to prove a 
relinquishing of citizenship fell on the government). 
117 Id. at 255–256 n.2 (translating into English the full Mexican oath of 
allegiance). 
118 Id. at 270. 
119 In Re P.A.B., Bd. App. Rev. 6 (Sept. 29, 1982); Abramson, supra note 114, at 
878. 
120 Kahane v. Schultz, 653 F. Supp. 1486 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (deciding that taking 
a seat on the Israeli legislature and declaring allegiance to Israel did not indicate a 
voluntary abandonment of U.S. citizenship). 
121 Vance, 444 U.S. at 255–56 (“I therefore hereby expressly renounce [United 
States] citizenship, as well as any submission, obedience, and loyalty to any 
foreign government. . . .”). 
122 Kahane, 653 F. Supp. at 1494 (“The government’s burden is to prove that 
Kahane intended to relinquish American citizenship.  The most it can prove, 
instead, is that Kahane is a hypocrite, for telling people that they should do as he 
says and not as he does.”). 
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citizenship and expatriation has effectively transformed the legal 
vision.  Focus is redirected from the sovereign nation and its 
demographic self-identity to the inviolable individual and his self-
interested legal status.  The Constitution’s preferred theme of 
personal liberty has come to prevail over international law’s 
preferred theme of nationhood.123  While nationality in the 
international law arena has come to establish the legal integration 
of persons within sovereign nations, citizenship in the 
constitutional law arena establishes the legal protection of persons 
from the acts of their government.  The law thus embraces two 
distinct possibilities when it comes to the meaning of citizenship:  
the nation as a collective whole needing legal definition as a single 
entity, and the state as an aggregate of individuals each needing 
protection against the society at large.124 
4.  NATION AND CITIZEN IN EXTRADITION LAW 
The vision of nationals as a cog in the societal wheel and that of 
the citizen as a self-standing force in opposition to state action have 
met directly, and clashed, in the law of extradition.  As a starting 
point, international theorists have long perceived the community 
of nations to operate under a natural duty to extradite offenders 
from neighboring states.125  This duty is most frequently translated 
into an interstate obligation to ensure that no one jurisdiction 
stands as a safe haven or refuge for serious offenders fleeing 
another jurisdiction.126  Some early theorists limited the sphere of 
operation of extradition only to those international relations 
 
123 See Morgan & Attias, supra note 36, at 204–06 (discussing the 
interconnection between these two apparently contradictory themes). 
124 Id. at 206. 
125 See, e.g., 3 EMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF 
NATURAL LAW, ch. 6, reprinted in CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 136–37 (Charles 
G. Fenwick trans., Carnegie Inst. 1916) (1758) (“[T]he sovereign should not permit 
his subjects to trouble or injure the subjects of another State . . . [the sovereign] 
should . . . deliver [the offender] up to the injured State, so that it may inflict due 
punishment upon him.”) 
126 See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & EDWARD M.WISE, AUT DEDERE AUT JUDICARE: 
THE DUTY TO EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 23 (1995) (discussing 
extradition as a moral, not legal duty, unless written into an extradition treaty).  
See also Jann K. Kleffner, The Impact of Complementarity on National Implementation 
of Substantive International Criminal Law, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 86 (2003) (discussing 
whether extradition is a state duty or a state right). 
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backed by an enforceable treaty.127  However, Grotius’ maxim:  
“extradite or prosecute,”128 has long placed the international 
exchange of fugitives between nations at the epicenter of the 
contest between the national as owing duties and allegiance to the 
state community of which he is a member, and the citizen as 
holding rights to be asserted against any combination of sovereign 
states.129 
The compromise followed by most civil law jurisdictions, and a 
number of common law countries, has been to extradite only third-
party nationals, protecting citizens of the requested state from 
being the subject of an international exchange.130  In contrast, the 
United States has, since its first extradition agreements with 
England, France, and Switzerland, been prepared to extradite its 
own citizens on the same basis as nationals of the treaty partners or 
of third countries.131  While it is possible for a treaty to preclude the 
extradition of nationals,132 U.S. policy has generally been 
antagonistic to the idea.133  In fact, in 1913, the Supreme Court 
ruled that reciprocity is not a necessary ingredient to extradition 
treaty enforcement, and American fugitives can be sent by the 
 
127 See 7 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, THE ELEMENTS OF UNIVERSAL JURISPRUDENCE, ch. 
3, §§ 23–24 (William A. Oldfather trans., 1931) (1672) (supporting the view that 
extradition must be codified in a treaty); Edward M. Wise, Some Problems of 
Extradition, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 709, 720–23 (1968) (discussing some offenses 
traditionally excluded from extradition, including those political, military, and 
fiscal in nature).  See also 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1994) (stating the modern requirement 
in America that a treaty be in force for extradition); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 475, cmt. a (1987). 
128 2 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS, ch. XXI, §§ 3, 4, 5(1), 5(3) (Francis 
W. Kelsey trans. 1925) (1642), referenced and discussed in M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, 
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 218 n.135 (2d ed. 
1999). 
129 See Edward M. Wise, Extradition: The Hypothesis of a Civitas Maxima and 
the Maxim Aut Dedere Aut Judicare, 62 REV. INT’L DE DROIT PÉNAL 109 (1991). 
130 See Robert W. Rafuse, The Extradition of Nationals, 24 ILL. STUD. SOC. SCI.  75 
(1939) (providing an early review of these policies). 
131 IVAN ANTHONY SHEARER, EXTRADITION LAW IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 97–98 
(1971). 
132 See Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 (1936) (holding 
that the United States will not extradite without a treaty); ETHAN A. NADELMANN, 
COPS ACROSS BORDERS: THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF U.S. CRIME ENFORCEMENT 
429–30 (1993) (discussing what came to be dubbed the “Valentine infirmity”). 
133 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES, § 475 n.4 (1987) (describing the U.S. opposition to limitations on 
extraditions based on accused’s nationality). 
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United States to countries which refuse to send their own nationals 
in return.134 
While the blanket exemption of nationals from the extradition 
process has been condemned as a matter of international law 
theory,135 several prominent civil law countries in Western Europe 
continue to refuse extradition of their own citizens.136  Among 
Latin American countries, the practice has also tended to exempt 
nationals, despite substantial American pressure to change policies 
to accommodate the war on drugs.  Thus, for example, Colombia 
agreed in 1982 in a revised extradition treaty to send fugitive 
citizens to the United States, but the treaty was declared 
unenforceable by the Colombia Supreme Court in 1986 in a 
decision widely perceived to be a capitulation to the power of 
narcotics cartels.137  Extraditions were reinstated for Colombians, 
without judicial review, by executive order of the President in 
1989,138 but were permanently eliminated in 1991 when extradition 
 
134 See Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 451 (1913) (granting an order for 
extradition to Italy of a U.S. citizen who murdered his wife in Italy). 
135 See Draft Convention on Extradition, 29 AM J. INT. L. Supp. 123–36 (1935) 
(discussing how a requested state will not decline to extradite an individual on 
the grounds that he is a national of that state); Yoram Dinstein, Major 
Contemporary Issues in Extradition Law, 84 AM. SOC’Y INT’L PROC. 389, 404 (1990).  
But see Model Treaty on Extradition, G.A. Res. 116, art. 4(a), U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/45/116 (stating that the General Assembly has resolved that the refusal to 
extradite nationals is reasonable if there is a domestic prosecution is offered in the 
alternative). 
136 Switzerland, Germany, and France are the most prominent of these.  Italy 
changed its policy to permit extradition of Italian nationals in 1946.  See SHEARER, 
supra note 131, at 102–10 (discussing the relevance of the nationality of a fugitive 
in international extradition law).  The Netherlands is one notable exception to this 
rule among European civil law countries.  See Extradition Treaty, U.S.-Neth., art. 
1, June 24, 1980, 35 U.S.T. 1334 (allowing extradition in art. 1); NADELMANN, supra 
note 132, at 431 (discussing how the U.S.-Netherlands extradition treaty permits 
extradition as long as a prisoner transfer treaty binds both the United States and 
the Netherlands). 
137 See Decision on Extradition, Case File No. 1558, June 25, 1987 (S. Ct.) 
(Colom.), reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 492 (1988) (holding unanimously that the law was 
unconstitutional because the President had not signed it).  See also Mark A. 
Sherman, United States International Drug Control Policy, Extradition, and the Rule of 
Law in Colombia, 15 NOVA L. REV. 661, 687 (1991) (discussing the case). 
138 See Bruce Michael Bagley, Dateline Drug Wars: Colombia: The Wrong 
Strategy, FOR. POL’Y, Winter 1989–90, at 154, 155 (describing President Barco’s 
declaration of “all-out war on Colombia’s drug cartels”); NADELMANN, supra note 
132, at 433 (explaining how President Barco renewed extradition without judicial 
review for Colombian drug traffickers after the assassination of the leading 
candidate in the upcoming presidential election). 
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of citizens was rendered unconstitutional by means of a specific 
constitutional amendment.139 
The extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico 
has likewise proved to be a highly contentious instrument in terms 
of the two-way flow of nationals.  In the first place, although the 
treaty was negotiated in terms meant to grant each of the signing 
governments the discretionary power to extradite its own 
nationals,140 the governing clause is stated in the negative: 
“[n]either [c]ontracting [p]arties shall be bound to deliver up its 
own nationals. . . .”141  For its part, the United States government 
has been willing to extradite U.S. citizens even in the face of a 
credible claim that the evidence supporting the Mexican 
allegations were obtained through torture.142  Moreover, the Courts 
of Appeals have specifically rejected the argument that the United 
States should put a moratorium on extraditions of U.S. citizens to 
Mexico until such time as Mexico determines that it will extradite 
its nationals for trial in the United States.143 
By contrast, the Mexican legal system has traditionally barred 
extradition of citizens,144 although it has reserved for the executive 
branch the discretion to determine case by case whether 
exceptional circumstances warranting extradition of a Mexican 
citizen exist.145  This has typically been justified on the ground that 
the Mexican courts have inherent jurisdiction over and are 
competent to try all crimes, wherever committed, that are 
 
139 See Mark A. Sherman, Colombian Constitutional Assembly Endorses Ban on 
Extradition of Nationals, 7 INT. ENF. LAW REP. 174 (1991). 
140 See Joshua S. Spector, Extraditing Mexican Nationals in the Fight Against 
International Narcotics Crimes, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1007, 1020 (1998) (“Some 
extradition treaties, such as the treaty between Mexico and the United States, give 
the executive discretionary power to determine whether to extradite a national.”); 
see also, M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW 
AND PRACTICE 589 (3d ed. 1996). 
141 Extradition Treaty art. 9(1), U.S.-Mex., May 4, 1978, 31 U.S.T. 5059. 
142 See, e.g., Mainero v. Gregg, 164 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 1999) (declining to 
overturn an extradition order based on the facts of the case because of the rule of 
non-inquiry and minimal grounds for creation of a humanitarian exception). 
143 See Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1107 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding 
that whether the United States should deny extradition to Mexico until Mexico 
reciprocates is a question for the executive branch and not the judicial branch). 
144 See Alan D. Bersin, El Tercer Pals: Reinventing the U.S./Mexico Border, 48 
STAN. L. REV. 1413, 1419 (1996) (explaining that Mexico refuses to extradite its 
nationals as a matter of national policy). 
145 See Spector, supra note 140, at 1008 n.15 (describing how, in contrast, 
Mexican law is interpreted by its executive to de facto prohibit extradition). 
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perpetrated by Mexican nationals.146  Despite assurances to the 
contrary,147 through most of the twentieth century Mexican officials 
so rarely acted on extradition warrants aimed at their citizens that 
the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency developed a practice of 
bypassing the extradition process altogether by kidnapping 
fugitives and smuggling them into U.S. territory for trial.148  In 
recent years, in response to increased pressure to follow U.S. law 
enforcement policies,149 Mexico has been more willing to deem 
drug traffickers as falling under the “exceptional circumstances” 
category denying selected Mexican nationals from the exemption 
otherwise applicable to all Mexican nationals.150  That said, the 
Mexican policy has been enforced inconsistently, with protection 
from extradition frequently applied even to fugitives accused of 
crimes of extreme violence.151 
 
146 See 6 WHITEMAN DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 866, 877 (1968); Spector, 
supra note 140, at 1023. 
147 The U.S. Secretary of State was apparently assured by his Mexican 
counterpart as early as 1928 that Mexico has no firm policy of exempting its 
nationals from extradition.  See Bruce Zagaris & Julia Padierna Peralta, Mexico–
United States Extradition and Alternatives: From Fugitive Slaves to Drug Traffickers–
150 Years and Beyond the Rio Grande’s Winding Course, 12 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 
519, 530 (1997) (describing how Mexico’s Foreign Affairs Minister assured the 
United States ambassador that Mexico “considered each case only after a careful 
study of the circumstances”). 
148 See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 656 (1992) (holding 
that being forcibly abducted did not prevent Alvarez-Machain’s trial in the United 
States for violation of U.S. law).  On the fallout of the reciprocal Mexican and 
American policies toward extradition and kidnapping, see Aimee Lee, Comment, 
United States v. Alvarez-Machain: The Deleterious Ramifications of Illegal 
Abductions, 17 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 126, 128 (1993) (arguing that the United States 
“should make every effort to refrain from abductions in order to avoid 
consequences ranging from international censure to retaliatory measures”). 
149 See Maria Celia Toro, The Internationalization of Police: The DEA in Mexico, 
86 J. AM. HIST. 623, 637 (1999) (“All major ‘wars on drugs’ undertaken by the 
Mexican government have had an important outward orientation.”). 
150 See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the U.S. Attorney, Dist. of Ariz., Two 
Mexican Nationals Extradited from Mexico Found Guilty in Naco, Ariz. Drug 
Tunnel Case (Nov. 1, 2007), available at http://phoenix.fbi.gov/ 
dojpressrel/2007/px110107.htm (describing how two men who were extradited to 
the United States to stand trial for cocaine trafficking were found guilty by a jury 
in federal court). 
151 See Kate O’Beirne, Like a Good Neighbor? Mexico and its Refusal to Extradite, 
NAT’L REV., Feb. 9, 2004, at 26 (discussing how a deputy sheriff’s killer who fled to 
Mexico was unlikely to face imprisonment because Mexican policy forbids 
extradition of its nationals). 
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The controversy over extraditing nationals strikes the dual 
chords of which the international and constitutional norms 
surrounding nationality and citizenship are composed.  On one 
hand, the image of citizens as non-extraditable parts of the nation 
stands opposite that of citizens as rights holder as against her 
nation,152 although both lead to the same result.  By contrast, the 
image of fugitives as extraditable individuals imbued with 
personal stature and responsibility stands opposite that of accused 
persons wedded to the society and locale in which their crime was 
committed,153 although again both lead to the same result.  
Whether the state in question chooses to extradite its nationals or 
to keep them at home, the dual strands of nationality law are 
inevitably in play.  Persons are both part of society and apart from 
it, and their citizenship can potentially stand for both positions. 
4.1. Law and Politics of Drug Extraditions 
Among U.S. policymakers and critics, it has often been debated 
whether the anti-narcotics campaign of the past several decades is 
a product of law enforcement necessity154 or cynical politics;155 
likewise, it has been debated whether the global drug prohibition 
has been a winning156 or a losing endeavor.157  Additionally, in U.S. 
 
152 As Kelsen has said, these approaches are wrapped up in the notion of “a 
citizen’s right to be ‘protected’ by his state as the counterpart of his allegiance.” 
KELSEN, supra note 69, at 237. 
153 As the Privy Council has said, these approaches are wrapped up in the 
aphorism, “all crime is local.”  Mcleod v. Attorney-General, [1891] A.C. 455 (P.C.) 
(appeal taken from Austl.). 
154 See, e.g., Michele Leonhart, U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency Acting 
Administrator, Video Introduction at the California Science Center: Target 
America: Opening Eyes to the Damage Drugs Cause (October 2008), transcript 
available at http://www.justice.gov/dea/speeches/s100208.html (urging visitors 
to the exhibition to end the cycle of drug addiction and drug abuse). 
155 See, e.g., Fintan O’Toole, Drug War Invented By Nixon to Extend His Power, 
IRISH TIMES, Aug. 13, 1999, available at http://www.druglibrary.org 
/think/~jnr/nixon.htm (explaining that the drug war began with the Nixon 
administration’s cynical politics). 
156 See, e.g., Mitchell S. Rosenthal, Consultant Paper: Winning the War on Drugs, 
Oct. 1, 1985, available at http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/govpubs/amhab 
/amhabc9d.htm (expressing that the government cannot win the war on drugs 
until there is a “positive consensus on the strict enforcement of drug laws,” but 
that this increased pressure will eventually erode drug use and the drug market). 
157 See, e.g., Ben Wallace-Wells, How America Lost the War on Drugs, ROLLING 
STONE, Dec. 13, 2007, at 2, available at http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/ 
story/17438347/how_america_lost_the_war_on_drugs/print (discussing why the 
United States lost the “War on Drugs” in the post-Escobar era). 
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legal commentary, it has frequently been debated whether the 
Constitution supports the fight against drug use and trafficking158 
or is contrary to the “war” effort.159  Whatever side one prefers in 
these debates, it is clear from the U.S. interventions in the 
Colombian and Mexican drug wars that international politics 
cannot be factored out of the debates over extraditing nationals.160 
Running parallel with the explicit linkage of drug law 
enforcement to foreign policy goals,161 are the judicial politics that 
underscore recent judgments.  The dual nature of nationality, as an 
identity marker that affiliates persons with sovereign states and as 
a rights emblem that sets persons apart from state power, has 
given rise to a set of cases that reflect a confusion of ideological 
motifs.  The nationality cases in extradition law bring to the surface 
the fact that courts appear unable to determine whether due 
process is owed by states to persons or to each other.  This 
dilemma, in turn, has led adjudicators to confuse the civil 
libertarianism of criminal law with state self-interest, and the 
authoritarianism of law enforcement with international 
cooperation. 
Three contemporary extradition cases,162 each sending a 
suspected drug fugitive to the United States, will illustrate the 
 
158 See Radley Balko, War on Drugs—and the Bill of Rights, CATO INST., Jan. 31, 
2005, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=3659 (“Since one can’t 
have property rights for illicit drugs, a search can’t violate the Fourth 
Amendment.”). 
159 See Ethan A. Nadelmann, The War on Drugs is Lost, NAT’L REV., Feb. 12, 
1996, at 38, 38 (1996), (“The ‘war on drugs’ has failed to accomplish its stated 
objectives, and it cannot succeed so long as we remain a free society, bound by 
our Constitution.”). 
160 See Feature: In Mexico, Now It’s Calderon’s Drug War, DRUG WAR CHRON., 
Jan. 26, 2007, available at http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/470/fulltext#2.  
For a more thorough exploration of the relationship between the drug wars on 
U.S. foreign policy, see ANDREAS & NADELMANN, supra note 27, at 153 (illustrating 
how political turmoil in Colombia led the Colombian government to flip-flop 
between implementation and refusal to implement its extradition treaty with the 
United States). 
161 See U.S.-Colombia Relations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Western 
Hemisphere of the H. Comm. of Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 1, 2 (2007) (statement of 
Hon. Rep. Hastert) (“The illicit drug trade is a high priority and a national 
security issue we must continue to deal with and defeat.  It is a part of the war on 
terrorism. . . .”). 
162 See Knowles v. United States, [2006] UKPC 38 (P.C.) (appeal taken from 
Bah.); CrimA 4596/05 Rosenstein v. Israel, [2005] 2 IsrSC 232, para. 44 (discussing 
with approval the “center of gravity” approach as the preferred rule in extradition 
law in Canada); Lake v. Canada (Minister of Just.), [2008] 1 S.C.R. 761 (Can.) 
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phenomenon.  Although all three of the judgments discussed 
below are from legal systems with much in common with the 
United States,163 the judiciary in each case draws not on U.S. 
constitutional law as a source of authority but on the nearest thing: 
Canadian constitutional law.  The geographic proximity to the 
ultimate enforcement jurisdiction, however, is not as important as 
the normative proximity of Canadian jurisprudence to both U.S.-
style constitutional law164 and international law.165  Of course, to 
say that Canadian extradition law includes constitutional and 
international legal norms is to express an ambiguity; as has been 
seen, nationality and citizenship rules are capable of pointing in 
both a state-oriented and a rights-oriented direction. 
 
(dismissing an appeal for extradition to the United States after pleading guilty to 
charges including conspiracy to traffic crack cocaine).  See also supra notes 17–19 
and accompanying text. 
163 See, e.g., Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71 (1938) (exhibiting 
the English common law origins of U.S. state common law systems as reflected in 
the long-standing influence of Swift v. Tyson); Canada’s Legal System, THE CANADA 
E-BOOK, Jan. 15, 2004, at 1, available at http://www43.statcan.ca/04/04b 
/04b_005_e.htm (describing how outside Quebec, which utilizes a civil law 
system, the Canadian legal system is based on common law); Shlomo Guberman, 
The Development of the Law in Israel: The First 50 Years, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Former Deputy Attorney General (Legislation), Sept. 25, 2000, 
https//www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/History/Modern+History/Israel+at+50                 
/Development+of+the+Law+in+Israel-+The+First+50+Yea.htm (discussing how 
the Israeli system incorporated British Mandate law upon independence); 
Permanent Mission of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas to the United Nations, 
Bahamas Government Information, http://www.un.int/bahamas/Bahamas 
_Government_Info.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 2009) (illustrating that the English 
common law was a basis for Bahamian legal system and recognizing Queen 
Elizabeth II as the Bahamian head of state). 
164 See Beverley McLaghlin, P.C., Chief Justice of Canada, Remarks at the 
Supreme Court of Canada: Protecting Constitutional Rights: A Comparative View 
of the United States and Canada, Apr. 5, 2004, transcript available at 
http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/court-cour/ju/spe-dis/bm04-04-05-eng.asp (“Canada, 
like the United States, is a federal democracy. We vote for our politicians at 
federal and state (we call them provincial) elections and if we don’t like what they 
do, we vote them out the next time.  Canada, like the United States, has a 
constitution that guarantees the fundamental rights and freedoms of every person 
in the country.”). 
165 Baker v. Canada, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, para. 70 (Can.) (incorporating 
humanitarian norms contained in U.N. Convention on Rights of the Child  into 
interpretation of Canadian constitutional rights of deportee); R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 
3 S.C.R. 697 (incorporating International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
into Canadian Charter of Rights interpretation of freedom of expression); Slaight 
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038 (incorporating International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and  Cultural Rights into interpretation of workers’ 
rights in Canada). 
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4.1.1. Knowles: ‘Ninety’ Percent Wrong 
In December of 2000, a federal grand jury in Florida indicted 
Samuel “Ninety” Knowles—a colorful Bahamian national who, as 
reported by the local press, “got his nickname by blowing $90,000 
in one day”166—on several counts of conspiracy to possess, 
distribute, and import cocaine and marijuana into the United 
States.167  The indictment formed the basis of an extradition request 
from the U.S. government to the Republic of Bahamas,168 which 
was in turn challenged in habeus corpus proceedings on the 
grounds that the statutory conditions for extradition had not been 
met.169  During the course of lengthy appeal and review 
proceedings, and well before the signing of an extradition order by 
the Bahamian Foreign Minister,170 the President of the United 
States exercised his statutory authority to designate Knowles as a 
foreign drug “kingpin,”171 thereby seizing his U.S. assets and 
barring him from using the U.S. financial system prior to any 
judicial finding of guilt.172  
In one of his two trips to the Privy Council, Knowles 
challenged the extradition to the United States on the grounds that 
the “kingpin” designation was widely published, notorious, and 
tantamount to a public declaration of his guilt.173  As the defense 
 
166 Macushla N. Pinder, U.S. Wants Ninety’s Money, BAHAMA JOURNAL, Sept. 8, 
2006, available at http://www.jonesbahamas.com/?c=45&a=9926. 
167 Knowles v. United States (Knowles II), [2007] W.L.R. 47, para. 2. 
168 Knowles v. United States (Knowles I), [2004] UKPC 10, para. 3 (P.C.) 
(appeal taken from Bah.). 
169 See Extradition Act, 1994, § 7(1) (Bah.) (restrictions on extradition); id. § 
11(3) (Bah.) (court’s power to discharge extradition request). 
170 Rupert Missick, Ninety Knowles U.S. Extradition Order is Signed, TRIBUNE 
(Bah.), Apr. 13, 2004, available at http://www.bahamasb2b.com/news/wmview 
.php?ArtID=3534. 
171 Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 1901–08; 8 U.S.C. 
§1182(a)(2)(C); Exec. Order No. 12,978, 60 C.F.R. 205 (Oct. 21, 1995).  Knowles was 
designated on May 31, 2002. 
172 See Peter L. Fitzgerald, Drug Kingpins and Blacklists: Compliance Issues with 
U.S. Economic Sanctions: Part 3, 5 J. MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL 162 (2001) 
(discussing the consequences of a “kingpin” designation). 
173 The challenge to a fair trial in the face of a “kingpin” designation was 
successful in a Bahamian motions court on June 23, 2004, and inspired a number 
of similar challenges in other Caribbean jurisdictions. See Lloyd Williams, Full 
Court to Determine Whether ‘Drug Kingpin’ Accused Can Get Fair Trial in US, 
JAMAICA OBSERVER, Oct. 3, 2005, available at http://www.jamaicaobserver.com 
/news/html/20051003T000000-0500_89659_OBS_FULL_COURT_TO 
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put it, once in the United States, “the jurors at his trial might well 
know or learn of his designation . . . [and] his trial would not be 
fair if a juror were prejudiced by such knowledge.”174  Moreover, 
the U.S. statute triggered a citizenship issue, the other half of 
Knowles’ challenge being that the prejudice against his fair trial 
“derived from his nationality, since the [Foreign Narcotics Kingpin 
Designation] Act did not apply to U.S. citizens.”175  Thus, although 
the terms of the U.S.-Bahamas Extradition Treaty specify that 
“extradition shall not be refused on the grounds that the fugitive is 
a citizen or national of the Requested State”,176 the citizenship 
question played a central role in the fairness/discrimination 
argument both in court and in the public discourse that 
accompanied the Bahamian proceedings.177 
The “kingpin” issue barely got off the ground when “Ninety” 
was sent fifty miles across the Gulf Stream to face the federal 
charges in Miami.178  Indeed, the Bahamas Court of Appeal ruled 
after his departure that the government had acted prematurely in 
sending him to stand trial.179  The identical question of prejudice to 
foreign extraditees, however, had in the meantime been considered 
by the Privy Council in yet another drug extradition from yet 
another Caribbean jurisdiction, the islands of St. Kitts and Nevis.180 
Two cocaine co-conspirators, Noel Heath and Glenroy Mathews, 
had been designated as foreign drug “kingpins” on June 1, 2000,181 
 
_DETERMINE_WHETHER__DRUG_KINGPIN__ACCUSED_CAN_GET_FAIR 
_TRIAL_IN_US.asp (last visited Nov. 11, 2009). 
174 Knowles II, [2007] W.L.R., para. 4. 
175 Id. 
176 Extradition Treaty, U.S.-Bah., art. 4, Mar. 9, 1990, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102–
17 (1994). 
177 See Candia Dames, U.S. Ambassador Says Ninety Will Get Fair Trial, BAHAMA 
J., Sept. 4, 2006, available at http://www.jonesbahamas.com/?c=45&a=9885 
(explaining U.S. Ambassador Rood’s belief that the larger jury pool and 
anonymity available in the U.S. would guarantee a fair trial). 
178 See Raymond Kongwa, Ninety’s Lawyers Retaliate, NASSAU GUARDIAN, Aug. 
30, 2006, at A1 (noting that Knowles was extradited after a date had been set for a 
further Bahamian court hearing). 
179 See Tosheena Robinson-Blair, Ninety’s Extradition Wrong, BAHAMA J., Sept. 
14, 2007, available at http://www.jonesbahamas.com/?c=45&a=14145 (suggesting 
procedural negligence on the part of the Bahamian Courts resulted in wrongful 
extradition of Ninety). 
180 Heath and Matthew v. United States, [2005] U.K.P.C. 45 (P.C.) (appeal 
taken from St. Kitts and Nevis). 
181 See OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSET CONTROL, U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, WHAT 
YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT SANCTIONS AGAINST DRUG TRAFFICKERS, AN OVERVIEW 
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and, according to the Privy Council, had been announced as such 
on a U.S. government website despite provisions in the legislation 
for non-disclosure of the designee’s name if such disclosure could 
jeopardize the integrity of the ongoing criminal trial.182 
In a relatively brief judgment, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-
Heywood gave the kingpin argument relatively short shrift.  
Analogizing the problem to one of ordinary domestic publicity,183 
the law lords were willing to leave it to the ultimate trial judge to 
determine an appropriate remedy.184  Turning to the particular 
problem of foreign proceedings, and the fact that the domestic 
extradition court cannot predict the remedies that a foreign trial 
court will invoke, the court fell back on a presumption of judicial 
innocence.185  Lord Brown cited the 1987 judgment of the Supreme 
Court of Canada in Argentina v. Mellino186 in order to invoke what 
he found to be the commonplace principle that “[o]ur courts must 
assume that [the defendant] will be given a fair trial in the foreign 
country.”187 
While the presumption may sound uncontentious on the 
surface, a closer reading of the Canadian jurisprudence reveals the 
logical platform on which it rests to be a platform in motion.  In the 
first place, Lord Brown credited Justice Lamer with the persuasive 
quote,188 although it was Justice La Forest’s majority judgment in 
which the relevant passage appeared,189 and not Justice Lamer’s 
dissent which came to the directly opposite conclusion.190  That 
error, however, was only the tip of the iceberg.  More significantly, 
 
OF THE FOREIGN NARCOTICS KINGPIN DESIGNATION ACT 1, available at 
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/narco/drugs.pdf. 
182 See Heath, [2005] UKPC, para. 24 (noting legislative provisions for non-
disclosure of a person’s name if such disclosure would compromise an ongoing 
criminal prosecution). 
183 See id. para. 25 (explaining the trial court, rather than the appellate court, 
is the appropriate forum for such challenges on the basis of publicity concerns). 
184 See Boodram v. Attorney General, [1996] A.C. 842 (P.C.) (appeal taken 
from Jam.). 
185 See Heath, [2005] UKPC, para. 26 (stating fugitives must be “at risk of 
suffering a flagrant denial of justice”). 
186 Argentina v. Mellino, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 536 (Can.). 
187 Id. para. 36. 
188 See Heath, [2005] UKPC, para. 26 (“A convenient statement of that 
principle in the specific context of extradition is to be found in Lamer J.’s 
judgment . . . .”). 
189 Mellino, [1987] 1 S.C.R., para. 36. 
190 Id. paras. 40–43 (Lamer, J., dissenting). 
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Justice La Forest himself appears to have been flowing against the 
tide of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms191 in his 
Mellino judgment, opining that “the Charter has no application to 
extradition hearings,”192 and likening the proceeding to a 
preliminary inquiry.193  As Justice Lamer pointed out in dissent, 
this pronouncement replayed a debate in which that same court 
had engaged earlier that very year in Canada v. Schmidt.194  There, 
the court had reasoned that, “[t]here can be no doubt that the 
actions undertaken by the Government of Canada in extradition as 
in other matters are subject to scrutiny under the Charter (s. 32).”195  
The novel task for the court in Mellino was not assessing the legal 
question of the Charter’s application,196 but determining the factual 
question of whose actions caused the violation of procedural rights 
since the Canadian Charter would not ordinarily apply to the acts 
of a foreign legal system alone.197  
The crucial sentence in Justice La Forest’s judgment in Mellino 
is his assertion that, “extradition proceedings must be approached 
with a view to conform with Canada’s international obligations.”198  
The application of constitutional rights to the extradition context 
was perceived as contrary to international norms.  Indeed, the 
judgment goes out of its way to characterize the entire 
constitutional challenge as an attempt to have Canadian courts 
assume responsibility for supervising what is essentially 
diplomatic activity; this, La Forest opines, “strikes me as being in 
fundamental conflict with the principle of comity on which 
extradition is based.”199  Harking back to a point he had made in 
Schmidt, La Forest perceives extradition process not as part and 
 
191 Constitution Act, 1982, pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), 
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.). 
192 Mellino, [1987] 1 S.C.R., para. 16. 
193 See id. para. 10 (explaining the Court’s review of the executive’s decision 
to extradite is limited to specific circumstances and highly deferential). 
194 Id. para. 41 (Lamer, J., dissenting). 
195 Canada v. Schmidt, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 500, para. 35 (Can.). 
196 The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, by the express terms of 
section 24(1), is enforceable by any superior court judge, which would generally 
be the presiding judge at an extradition hearing. Mellino, 1 S.C.R., para. 49 
(Wilson, J., concurring). 
197 See Spencer v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 278, para. 5 (Can.) (holding that the 
Canadian Charter did not apply to the operation of Bahamian law in the Bahamas). 
198 Mellino, [1987] 1 S.C.R., para. 23. 
199 Id. para. 24. 
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parcel of criminal law—which is characterized as having a 
labyrinth of “requirements and technicalities . . . [which] apply 
only to a limited extent in extradition proceedings”200—but as a 
process engaged “pursuant to a treaty or other arrangement 
between these states acting in their sovereign capacity and 
obviously engages their honour and good faith.”201 
The fundamental legal relationship, in other words, is 
portrayed as an international one, with matters of due process 
taking a back seat to comity among nations.202  Thus, the Mellino 
judgment, on which the Privy Council relied in assessing the 
prejudicial “kingpin” designation, portrays the contest in an 
extradition case as not so much between the prosecution and the 
defense, but rather between the sovereign treaty partners.203  For 
this reason, procedural concerns can be all but ignored by the 
judicial branch, leaving the matter to the presumably more 
diplomatically sensitive judgment of the executive.204  It is a 
paradigmatically internationalist vision, where the legal identity of 
the defendant/fugitive is submerged to that of the nations he 
offended and to which he belongs.  The point is more than a practical 
one designed to ease the burdens of law enforcement, a frequently 
stated position in the discursive world of transnational crime and 
 
200 Id para. 23. 
201 Schmidt, [1987] 1 S.C.R., para. 26. 
202 Justice La Forest emphasized the concern of comity among nations in 
making decisions that necessarily involve extradition issues: 
Matters of due process generally are to be left for the courts to determine 
at the trial there as they would be if he were to be tried here.  Attempts to 
pre-empt decisions on such matters, whether arising through delay or 
otherwise, would directly conflict with the principles of comity on which 
extradition is based. . . . 
Mellino, [1987] 1 S.C.R., para. 36 
203 This tendency was reinforced in the 1999 amendments to Canada’s 
Extradition Act, S.C. 1999, c. 18.  Commenting on the pattern initiated by her 
father in his judicial capacity, Professor Anne LaForest has observed:  
[I]n enacting the 1999 Act, Canada did not merely follow and respond to 
an international movement that led it to alter the balance between comity 
and liberty in extradition hearings.  The reality is that Canada has gone 
further than virtually any other country in facilitating extradition.  
Anne Warner LaForest, The Balance between Liberty and Comity in the Evidentiary 
Requirements Applicable to Extradition Proceedings, 28 QUEEN’S L.J. 95, 140 (2002). 
204 See Mellino, [1987] 1 S.C.R., para. 36 (citing the U.K. practice of executive 
discretion in extradition matters in Royal Government of Greece v. Brixton Prison 
Governor, [1969] 3 All E.R. 1337 (H.L.)). 
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punishment.205  Rather, it is a deeply structured alternative vision of 
the nature of legal relations, perceiving the interstate mutuality of 
rights and obligations as the keynote to legality in an interdependent 
world.206 
What went unmentioned by the Privy Council in considering 
the arguments of the various Caribbean defendants is that the 
Mellino judgment—or at least “Ninety” percent of it—had been 
more recently set aside by the Supreme Court of Canada in United 
States v. Cobb.207  In that judgment, rendered some four years after 
Justice La Forest’s retirement from the Court,208 Justice Arbour 
declared that “the Charter applies to extradition proceedings in the 
sense that the treaty, the extradition hearing in Canada and the 
exercise of the executive discretion to surrender the fugitive all 
have to conform to the requirements of the Charter.”209  The 
problem, of course, is more than that the Privy Council couldn’t 
see the Arbour for La Forest.  It revitalized the vision of legal 
relations that had been suppressed in Mellino. 
In coming to her conclusion in Cobb, Justice Arbour set out the 
fugitive’s basic legal point, which in the circumstances was 
remarkably close to that argued by Knowles, Heath and Matthew 
in the Privy Council:  “[t]he respondent argues that any concern 
that the appellants may face unfair proceedings in the United 
States is a matter for the Minister, not for the extradition judge.”210  
At the same time, she indicated that a full answer to this contention 
has already been provided:  “both the extradition hearing and the 
exercise of the executive discretion to surrender a fugitive must 
conform with the requirements of the Charter, including the 
 
205 See, e.g., Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 89 
(1989) (“As movement about the world becomes easier and crime takes on a larger 
international dimension, it is increasingly in the interests of all nations that 
suspected offenders that flee abroad should be brought to justice.”). 
206 See Sharon A. Williams, Human Rights Safeguards and International 
Cooperation in Extradition: Striking the Balance, 3 CRIM. L.F. 191 (1992) (“This view of 
extradition law and process is one of mutual assistance in criminal matters 
between states.  Reciprocity is the keynote, with states having a mutuality of 
obligations.”). 
207 United States v. Cobb [2001] 1 S.C.R. 587 (Can.). 
208 See Justice Gerard V. La Forest’s Biography, Gerard V. La Forest Law 
Library, University of New Brunswick, http://lawlibrary.unbf.ca/G.V.LaForest 
.php (last visited Dec. 6, 2009). 
209 Cobb, [2001] 1 S.C.R., para. 24. 
210 Id. para. 33. 
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principles of fundamental justice.”211  In fact, the Supreme Court’s 
embrace of individual liberty over interstate cooperation in law 
enforcement had, after the La Forest era, become so powerful that 
it prompted legislative reform in order to tip the balance back.212  
As the parliamentary secretary to the Minister of Justice 
commented on introducing the Bill, “[e]ven with countries with a 
similar legal tradition such as the United States, we have heard on 
numerous occasions how difficult it is to obtain extradition from 
Canada.”213 
What the Privy Council’s confusion demonstrates is more than 
weak research; it is that the competing visions of the individual 
citizen in international law are all equally cogent.  Canada has 
swung from a regime under Mellino in which the constitution did 
not apply at all to interstate extraditions, to a regime under Cobb in 
which the Charter trumped all treaty powers, to its current regime 
under revised legislation and a new treaty214 which analysts claim 
“rival[s] in stark efficiency interstate rendition between individual 
states of the United States.”215  In other words, the citizen is 
elevated above the state or submerged within it, seemingly on an 
equally alternate footing.  The sovereignty of the constitution in 
protecting individual rights and the sovereignty of the state in 
facilitating cooperative law enforcement are easily flipped around, 
as they represent the two halves of the citizenship coin in 
international legal discourse.  One can turn 180 degrees with the 
case law and bar extradition that is prejudicial to citizens, or one 
can make a half turn and bid Ninety goodbye. 
 
211 Id. para. 30. 
212 For a review of the policy concerns leading up to the 2002 amendments to 
the Extradition Act, see Gary Botting, The Confluence of Extradition Practice in 
Canada and the United States, available at http://www.law.utoronto.ca/documents 
/zcalt04/bottling.doc (last visited Dec. 6, 2009). 
213 House of Commons Debates, Oct. 8, 1998, 1st Sess. 36th Parliament, v. 135, 
at 9004 (Can.). 
214 Second Protocol Amending the Treaty on Extradition between the 
Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America, 1853 
U.N.T.S. 407 (2001). 
215 Botting, supra note 212, at 43. 
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4.1.2.  Rosenstein:  Thin Reasoning 
In September of 2004, a grand jury in southern Florida indicted 
Ze’ev Rosenstein216—a stocky, domineering figure in the Tel Aviv 
underworld referred to as “The Fat Man” by undercover U.S. 
investigators in taped telephone conversations217—on charges of 
heading an international conspiracy to traffic in the drug 
methylenedioxy-methamphetamine (“MDMA,” more generally 
known as “ecstasy”).218  The indictment formed the basis of an 
extradition request from the government of the United States to the 
State of Israel.219  That request, in turn, prompted a challenge by 
the defense in the Jerusalem District Court on the grounds that 
extradition would violate Israeli constitutional safeguards.220 
In his appeal to Israel’s Supreme Court, Rosenstein presented a 
long list of legal arguments, the crux of which contended that since 
he is “an Israeli citizen and resident, and the alleged offense was 
committed entirely in Israel, extradition to another country 
deviates from the balance required by Basic Law: Human Dignity 
and Freedom, and by fundamental principles of penal law.”221  
Although by the time of his arrest Israel had revised its law to 
permit the extradition of Israeli citizens under certain 
circumstances,222 the defense argued that for a person whose center 
 
216 CrimA 4596/05 Rosenstein v. Israel, [2005] 2 IsrSC 232, para. 1 (“[T]he 
United States Government relayed a request to the Government of the State of 
Israel, for the extradiction of [] Ze’ev Rosenstein. . . .”). 
217 Tamara Lush, Al Capone of Israel Now Facing U.S. Courts, ST. PETERSBURG 
TIMES, Mar. 8, 2006, available at http://www.sptimes.com/2006/03/08/ 
Worldandnation/_Al_Capone_of_Israel_.shtml. 
218 See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (making it illegal to knowingly or intentionally 
“manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, 
distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance”), §  841(b)(1)(C) (laying out the 
sentences for different drug offenses), § 846 (punishing attempt and conspiracy to 
commit any of the offenses defined in this subchapter the same as committing the 
actual offense), §  952(a) (prohibiting imports into the U.S. any controlled 
substance specified in the statute except where the “Attorney General finds it 
necessary to provide for medical, scientific, or other legitimate purposes”), § 
960(b)(3) (defining the penalties for violating 21. U.S.C. §§ 952, 953, 955, 957, 959) . 
219 Rosenstein, [2005] 2 IsrSC, para. 5. 
220 Roni Singer, Underworld Kingpin Rosenstein to Appeal Against Extradition, 
HA’ARETZ, May 6, 2005, available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages 
/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=584295. 
221 Rosenstein, [2005] 2 IsrSC, para. 7. 
222 For a history of Israel’s citizenship bar to extradition, see Abraham 
Abramovsky & Jonathan I. Edelstein, The Post-Sheinbein Israeli Extradition Law: Has 
it Solved the Extradition Problems Between Israel and the United States or Has it Merely 
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of life is in the territory of the State, “the prosecution’s policy on 
drug offenses has long been to conduct trials in Israel, even if the 
act was committed outside of Israel.”223  Under the circumstances, 
the due process demanded by the alleged ecstasy financier was 
presented as a counterweight to the lead prosecutor’s assertion that 
extradition “is good for the country and good for the cooperation 
between countries against international crime.”224 
In rejecting the defendant’s challenges and arriving at its 
conclusion that Rosenstein can be sent to the United States, the 
court relied heavily on American investigatory evidence.225  While 
this appears to be part of an ongoing law enforcement strategy by 
Israeli authorities to contract large drug prosecutions out to the 
United States,226 the Israel Supreme Court relied not on American 
precedent but on Canadian constitutional law.  Two cases in 
particular, Libman227 and Cotroni,228 drew heavy attention.  Both 
decisions were authored by Justice La Forest in the 1980s and have 
become mainstays of Canadian legal thinking on international 
crime.  Each, however, imports as many problems into the 
Rosenstein analysis as it resolves, and each should be examined in 
the context in which the Israeli court deployed them. 
 
Shifted the Battleground?, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1 (2002); Oren M. Chaplin, 
American Justice Across the Ocean? The Case of Samuel Sheinbein, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 
967 (2001); Jesse Hallee, The Sheinbein Legacy: Israel’s Refusal to Grant Extradition as 
a Model of Complexity, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 667 (2000); Dina Maslow, Extradition 
From Israel: The Samuel Sheinbein Case, 7 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 387 (1999). 
223 Rosenstein, [2005] 2 IsrSC, para. 7. 
224 Laurie Copans, Court Says Israel Can Extradite to U.S., GUARDIAN, Nov. 30, 
2005, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlatest/story/0,1280,-5447095 
,00.html. 
225 Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales, Remarks at Tel Aviv University 
(June 27, 2006) (transcript available at http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ 
ag/speeches/2006/ag_speech_060627.html) (“The Rosenstein case highlights one 
of the most important ways in which we cooperate with our international law 
enforcement partners: our strong network of extradition treaties and mutual legal 
assistance treaties. These agreements allow the United States to share and receive 
assistance in obtaining evidence and bringing fugitives to justice around the 
world.”). 
226 See Marc Perelman, Israel Seeks U.S. Help to Fight Mob Crime Wave, JEWISH 
DAILY FORWARD, Oct. 16, 2008, available at http://www.forward.com/articles 
/14402/ (“Faced with a recent surge of mob-related murders, Israel appears to be 
reaching out to the United States for help in bringing its leading underworld 
figures to justice.”). 
227 Libman v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178 (Can.). 
228 Cotroni v. United States, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1469 (Can.). 
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Turning first to Libman, the Israeli court had an ear for sound 
bites, making reference to the most memorable line of Justice La 
Forest’s judgment declaring that, “In a shrinking world we are all 
our brother’s keepers.”229  The poetic language and sentiment was 
deployed in support of the portion of the Rosenstein judgment that 
dealt with “Cooperation in the Fight Against Crime.”230  It was 
quoted in support of the message that in a world of globalized 
crime the Israeli legal system must cooperate with U.S. law 
enforcement in sending an Israeli citizen to face justice in an 
American court rather than insisting, as the defendant requested, 
on a trial at home in Israel.231  The deep irony is that Libman, which 
involved a Canadian defendant who defrauded American 
customers in a mostly United States-based securities scam,232 
endorsed the trial at home of a Canadian who could have, and 
arguably should have, been sent for prosecution in the United 
States.233  In other words, the Libman judgment stood for an 
approach to transnational crime—prosecution at home234—that 
was the exact opposite of what the Rosenstein court used it to 
support.235 
The transformation from Libman’s “brother’s keepers” to 
Rosenstein’s ‘brother’s senders’ stood the comity of nations on its 
head.  Having performed this summersault, the Israeli court then 
turned its attention to Cotroni, the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
leading case on extradition and the constitutional rights of 
 
229 Rosenstein, [2005] 2 IsrSC, para. 39 (quoting Libman [1985] 2 S.C.R. at 214.). 
230 Id. 
231 Id. (“The first and central purpose of extradition law is the creation of an 
effective instrument for international cooperation in the fight against crime, 
particularly transnational crime.”). 
232 For the factual background, see Libman, 2 S.C.R., paras. 2–5. 
233 For my exploration of the international criminal law themes in Libman and 
related Canadian judgments in transnational criminal matters, see Edward M. 
Morgan, Criminal Process, International Law and Extra-Territorial Crime, 38 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 245 (1988). 
234 Libman, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178, para. 78 (“I have no difficulty in holding . . . that 
the counts of fraud with which the appellant is charged may properly be prosecuted 
in Canada, and I see nothing in the requirements of international comity that would 
dictate that this country refrain from exercising its jurisdiction.”). 
235 Rosenstein, [2005] 2 IsrSC, para. 39 (“[It is] inappropriate for a state, as a 
society in the community of civilized nations, to seclude itself within the narrow 
boundaries of its sovereignty. . . .”). 
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citizens.236  Unlike its reverse use of Libman, the Rosenstein court’s 
use of Cotroni was the same as the original Canadian court’s use of 
the case—i.e. in support of the idea that “it is often better that a 
crime be prosecuted where its harmful impact is felt and where the 
witnesses and the persons most interested in bringing the criminal 
to justice reside. . . .”237  The problem the court encountered was 
that the Cotroni logic, which was far from generous in its 
characterization of the Charter of Rights, was deployed in a 
judgment that otherwise endorsed a liberal view of constitutional 
safeguards based on the “human dignity” of persons coming 
before the Israeli courts.238  Moreover, the special protections for 
Israeli citizens,239 which parallel those at the heart of the Cotroni 
case for Canadian citizens,240 were interpreted in exactly the same 
way as the Canadian ones even though the policy implications of 
the two arguably pointed moved in opposite directions. 
In a factual situation parallel to that of Rosenstein,241 Cotroni 
was a Canadian citizen wanted for extradition to the United States 
for criminal conduct which took place entirely in the confines of his 
 
236 For a discussion of the Cotroni case and its place in Canadian 
constitutional jurisprudence, see Joanna Harrington, The Role for Human Rights 
Obligations in Canadian Extradition Law, 43 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 45 (2005).  See also, Ed 
Morgan, In the Penal Colony: Internationalism and the Canadian Constitution, 49 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 447 (1999) (addressing the intersection of Canadian 
constitutionalism and internationalism in the context of criminal law). 
237 Rosenstein, [2005] 2 IsrSC, para. 46 (quoting Cotroni v. United States, 
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 1469 (Can.)). 
238 See Rosenstein, [2005] 2 IsrSC, para. 53 (citation omitted): 
The right of a person accused of a criminal offense to due process is a 
constitutional basic right.  It stems from the right of the individual to 
freedom and dignity.  Dorner J. discussed this point:  
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom . . . granted the status of 
constitutional basic right to a person’s right to criminal due process, 
especially pursuant to Article 5 of the basic law, which determines 
the right to freedom, and pursuant to Articles 2 & 4, which 
determine the right to human dignity.  
239 Extradition Law, 1999, S.H. 1708, amend. 6 (Isr.). 
240 Section 6(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (“Mobility 
Rights”) provides: “Every citizen of Canada has the right to enter, remain in and 
leave Canada.”  Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B, Canada Act 1982, Ch. 11 
(U.K.). 
241 Rosenstein, [2005] 2 IsrSC, para. 61 (“True, appellant is Israeli.  The 
conspiracy was made in Israel.”). 
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Montreal home.242  As made clear in the Parliamentary committee 
in which section 6(1) of the Charter was originally debated,243 and 
as can be discerned by comparison to other human rights 
instruments which provide for a more circumscribed right of 
mobility,244 and as articulated in the relatively limited prior case 
law,245 the right to remain as an subset of mobility rights generally 
rests on “[t]he intimate relationship between a citizen and his 
country.”246  Indeed, it was this national bond that was stressed by 
Justice Wilson in her dissent, indicating that not only had the 
fugitive never voluntarily left his country of citizenship but that 
the very accusations at issue in the extradition hearing represented 
an exercise in extraterritorial law enforcement by the United 
States.247 
For Justice La Forest, the object of the Cotroni exercise appears 
to have been to send the citizen away, but to do so in a rhetorically 
more generous way than one might otherwise expect.  He therefore 
paid considerable lip service to prior Supreme Court 
pronouncements that Charter rights are to be subjected to “a 
generous rather than a legalistic” interpretation.248  Furthermore, 
he advocated interpretive flexibility249 in order to overcome any 
perceived formulaic rigidity of Charter tests such as that set out in 
 
242 For a description of the background facts, see Cotroni, [1989] 1 S.C.R., 
paras. 2–11. 
243 See Debates of the House of Commons, Jan. 1981, Parl. Deb, H.C. (1981) 
41–118 (Can.). 
244 See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, May, 3, 2002, protocol no. 4, art. 3(1), Europ. T.S. No. 005 
(“No one shall be expelled, by means either of an individual or of a collective 
measure, from territory of the State of which he is a national.”); International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 12 (granting the right 
leave any country, enter one’s own country, and move about in a country where 
one has legally entered); Canadian Bill of Rights, R.S.C. 1970, Appendix III, § 2 
(“No law of Canada shall be construed or applied as to (a) authorize or effect the 
arbitrary . . . exile of any person.”). 
245 See Skapinker v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., [1984] 1 S.C.R. 357, 382 (Can.) 
(holding that the right to work is not separate and distinct from the mobility 
provisions in which this right is discussed). 
246 Cotroni, [1989] 1 S.C.R., para 16. 
247 Id. paras. 66–100. 
248 Id. para. 36 (citing R. v. Jones, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284, 300 (Can.)). 
249 Id. para. 37 (citing R. v. Edwards Books & Art Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, 768 
(Can.) (accepting a flexible approach to the proportionality test)). 
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R. v. Oakes.250  This interpretive approach, in turn, had an 
ideological gloss that took as its starting point a view reminiscent 
of Justice La Forest’s opinion in Schmidt.  That is, that international 
cooperation in law enforcement, of which extradition is the prime 
example, is the modern antidote to the historic problem of legal 
parochialism.  In this rendition of international law, quite 
ironically, Charter protections are a retrograde force, “confin[ing] 
[Canadian society] to parochial and nationalistic concepts of 
community,”251 in the face of “an emerging world community from 
which not only benefits but responsibilities flow.”252  Quoting 
approvingly from those international law scholars most closely 
associated with this view, Justice La Forest indicated that, “[t]his 
attitude of lack of faith and actual distrust,”253 so typical of 
constitutional rights,254 “is not in keeping with the spirit behind 
extradition treaties.”255 
The great irony of the Cotroni judgment is that this espousal of 
international progressivism as a bulwark against the perceived 
regressivism of constitutional rights is premised on a view of the 
traditional place of extradition in the legal lexicon.  “For well over 
100 years,” Justice La Forest noted, “extradition has been a part of 
the fabric of our law.”256  This placing of the extradition issue, 
along with the Charter itself, in historical context,257 had its own 
 
250 See R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 114 (Can.) (establishing a two-step test 
that involves asking (1) if a specific Act violates the Charter and then (2) if there is 
a violation, whether the Act is “a reasonable limit prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society . . .”). 
251 Cotroni, [1989] 1 S.C.R., para. 29. 
252 Id. 
253 Id. para. 52 (citing Jean-Gabriel Castel & Sharon A. Williams, The 
Extradition of Canadian Citizens and Sections 1 and 6(1) of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, 25 CANADIAN Y.B. INT’L L. 268–9 (1987) [hereinafter Extradition 
of Canadian Citizens]. 
254 Whether intentionally or coincidentally, this formulation of the attitude 
underlying constitutional rights reflects a view expressed by constitutional 
theorists who come at constitutional law from the opposite ideological point of 
view from those expressed in Justice La Forest’s judgment or in the Castel and 
Williams piece from which he quotes. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY 
AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980) (discussing the various 
versions of representation-reinforcing theory of judicial review). 
255 Cotroni, [1989] 1 S.C.R., para. 52 (citing Extradition of Canadian Citizens at 
268–69). 
256 Id. para. 40. 
257 Id. para. 40 (citing Re Federal Republic of Germany and Rauca, [1983] 4 
C.C.C.3d 385, 404 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.)) (“The Charter was not enacted in a vacuum 
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interesting spin.  In effect, Justice La Forest succeeded in anchoring 
the un-anchorable.  He did so by supporting change on tradition 
and erecting the imagined future on the discernable past.  In one 
intricate set of reasons, Canada managed to look simultaneously 
forward and backward, ostensibly freeing itself from its nationalist 
past while realizing its time honored internationalist traditions. 
Thus, Rosenstein cited a Canadian judgment that belittled 
constitutionalism and elevated law enforcement, in support of the 
proposition that the constitutionalized Basic Laws258 require the 
court “to balance the unequal power relations between the accused 
and the prosecution, which usually enjoys an advantageous 
procedural status and additional advantages, and to ensure that 
the accused is given a full opportunity to make a case for his 
innocence. . . .”259  Likewise, the Rosenstein judgment cited a case 
that characterized sovereignty of the state as “parochial and 
nationalistic,”260 in support of a pronouncement that “international 
cooperation in the fight against crime”261 and “reinforces the 
principle of state sovereignty.”262 
The use of prominent Canadian cases in the Rosenstein 
judgment demonstrates that the state and the subjects of state 
power are reversible at will.  Libman was exploited for its rhetorical 
power in favor of international cooperation in a way that allowed 
its actual application of domestic unilateralism to go unnoticed.  
Cotroni was utilized for its result in favor of extradition in a way 
that allowed for its normative position downgrading 
constitutionalism and sovereignty to remain submerged.  In other 
words, the case of the Fat Man became a perfect laboratory for 
exploiting the thematic underbelly of Canadian constitutional law. 
 
and the rights set out therein must be interpreted rationally having regard to the 
then existing laws and, in the instant case, to the position which Canada occupies 
in the world and the effective history of the multitude of extradition treaties it has 
had with other nations.”).  Rauca is also cited in Rosenstein. See Rosenstein, [2005] 2 
IsrSC, para 46. 
258 For an explanation of the constitutional status of Israel’s Basic Laws, see 
David Kretzmer, The New Basic Laws on Human Rights: A Mini-Revolution in Israeli 
Constitutional Law? 26 ISRAEL L. REV. 238 (1992). For a comparison to Canadian 
constitutional law, see Lorraine Weinrib, The Canadian Charter of Rights as a Model 
for Israel’s Basic Laws, 4 CONST. FORUM 85 (1993). 
259 Rosenstein, [2005] 2 IsrSC, paras. 51–52. 
260 Cotroni, [1989] 1 S.C.R., para. 29. 
261 Rosenstein, [2005] 2 IsrSC, para 39. 
262 Id. para. 57 (observing that the decision not to apply local law in certain 
circumstances may also serve to reinforce state sovereignty). 
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The citizen, as answerable to any state and as protected by his 
own state, seems to go hand-in-hand with the Israeli court’s 
reversals of Canadian jurisprudence.  The reasoning may have 
been thin, but Rosenstein provides a stout platform for speculating 
about the relationship between international and constitutional 
theory.  In a close parallel to international pronouncements about 
citizenship rights,263 the Israeli court portrayed the state as subject 
to the sovereignty of an overarching legal regime while 
simultaneously being a sovereign master of its own house.264  
4.1.3.  Canada Jumps into Lake 
If there is any jurisdiction that can be counted on to properly 
rely on the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada, one 
would think it would be Canada itself.  However, that assumption 
has now been tested and undermined in Lake v. Canada (Minister of 
Justice).265  Talib Steven Lake was caught selling roughly 100 grams 
of crack cocaine in a series of transactions in Windsor, Ontario, and 
across the bridge in Detroit, Michigan, with an undercover officer 
of the Ontario Provincial Police.266  He was tried and convicted for 
the Canadian transactions.  After serving a relatively light sentence 
of three years in prison,267 he was processed for extradition to the 
United States where an indictment had been issued in the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan relating to the 
Detroit transaction.  Upon losing his committal battle in the 
Ontario courts, Lake requested that the Minister of Justice exercise 
his discretion not to order him extradited, but the Minister decided 
against him and ordered him sent back to Michigan in February 
2005.268 
The Minister incorrectly determined that Canada had no 
jurisdiction to try Lake on the Michigan charge,269 and thus, the 
 
263 See the discussion of Nottebohm, supra notes 41–50, and accompanying 
text. 
264 Rosenstein, [2005] 2 IsrSC, paras 54–57. 
265 Lake v. Canada (Minister of Just.), [2008] 1 S.C.R. 761 (Can.). 
266 Id. paras. 5–7. 
267 Id. para. 9 (noting that “[A]t the sentencing hearing before Ouellette J. of 
the Ontario Court (General Division) . . . Crown counsel indicated that . . . a three-
year sentence . . . [is] on the low end of the range with respect to these types of 
offenses”). 
268 Id. paras. 9–11. 
269 The Minister was found to be wrong, but not unreasonably wrong, by the 
Ontario Court of Appeal.  See United States v. Lake, [2006] 212 C.C.C. (3d) 51 (Ont. 
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extradition did not infringe his mobility rights under the Charter.  
The Minister also considered the prospect of Lake facing a 
mandatory minimum sentence of ten years under U.S. law—a far 
more severe punishment than would be meted out by the 
Canadian judicial system.  However, the Minister rejected Lake’s 
potential punishment under U.S. law as grounds for exercising his 
discretion in the fugitive’s favor because the minimum 
incarceration term was not seen to shock the conscience of 
Canadians.270  Lake sought judicial review of the Minister’s 
discretionary decision, and on appeal the Supreme Court of 
Canada determined that, whatever its failings, the ministerial 
decision deserved a level of deference with which the court should 
not interfere.271  Although he argued heatedly that “[t]he Minister 
is required to respect a fugitive’s constitutional rights in deciding 
whether to exercise his or her discretion . . .,”272 the court 
effectively threw cold water on Lake. 
The crux of the Lake decision is that “deference is owed to the 
Minister’s decision whether to order surrender once a fugitive has 
been committed for extradition.”273  Insisting that such decisions 
“will not be interfered with absent evidence of improper or 
arbitrary motives,”274 Lake analogized ministerial discretion in 
extradition to prosecutorial discretion in indictments.275  Since one 
or more of the “Cotroni factors”276 could be invoked to ground a 
 
C.A.) (Can.) (dismissing application for judicial review from a surrender order 
made by the Minister of Justice). 
270 For the “shock the conscience” standard as a bar to extradition, see 
Minister of Justice v. Schmidt, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 500, 522 (Can.).  For the same 
standard expressed as “simply unacceptable,” see United States v. Allard, [1987] 1 
S.C.R. 564, 572 (Can.). For an expression of the standard as “unjust” or 
“oppressive,” see Extradition Act, S.C. 1999, c. 18, § 44(1)(a). 
271 For the Supreme Court of Canada’s views on the standards of correctness 
and reasonableness in judicial review of administrative or executive decision-
making, see Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 (Can.). 
272 Lake v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2008] 1 S.C.R. 761, para. 35 (Can.), 
quoting United States v. Kwok, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 532, para. 80 (Can.). 
273 Id. para. 34. 
274 Lake, [2008] 1 S.C.R., para. 29. 
275 See generally R. v. Lyons, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309 (Can.) (holding prosecutorial 
discretion is consistent with the Chater); R. v. Beare, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 387 (Can.) 
(determining article 2 of Law on the Identification of Criminals is consistent with 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms). 
276 The court identified the relevant factors as: a) where the impact of offense 
was felt or likely to be felt; b) jurisdiction with greatest interest in prosecuting; c) 
police force that played the major role; d) jurisdiction to first lay charges; e) 
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U.S.-based prosecution, and the Minister could not “point to any 
public purpose that would be served by the [non-] extradition,”277 
the Minister’s decision to override the fugitive’s rights under 
section 6(1) of the Charter need not be reviewed.  Expressing the 
sentiment that contemporary law enforcement “cannot realistically 
be confined within national boundaries,”278 the court allowed the 
Minister—the very official whose actions are limited by the 
Charter279—to be the sole arbiter of the citizen’s fate under the 
Charter. 
In taking this deferential approach, the Supreme Court of 
Canada effectively reversed its own interpretive guidelines.  
Charter jurisprudence in Canada has taken a cue from early 
American expressions of popular sovereignty—government is seen 
to be “‘ordained and established’ in the name of the people.”280  It 
likewise has drawn inspiration from British constitutionalism, 
conferring “a generous interpretation . . . suitable to give 
individuals the full measure of the fundamental rights and 
freedoms. . . .”281  This synthesis has led to an original approach to 
the application and interpretation of the Charter that is oriented 
not toward the state power in issue,282 but toward the individual 
rights holder.  From its inception, the Charter has been called a 
“purposive document,”283 whose purpose is to “constrain 
governmental action . . . and not simply [to assess] its rationality in 
furthering some valid government objective.”284  Thus, 
Constitutional interpretation has proceeded as an “affirmation of 
 
jurisdiction ready to proceed to trial; f) place where evidence located; f) whether 
evidence is mobile; g) number and location of the accused; h) place of most of the 
criminal acts; i) nationality and residence of accused; j) severity of sentencing in 
each jurisdiction.  Lake, [2008] 1 S.C.R. para. 29. 
277 United States v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283, 354 (Can.). 
278 Cotroni v. United States, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1469, para. 27 (Can.). 
279 Constitution Act of 1982, § 32(1)(a) (1992) (“This Charter applies to the 
Parliament and government of Canada in respect of all matters within the 
authority of Parliament. . . .”). 
280 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 403 (1819). 
281 Minister of Home Affairs v. Fisher, [1980] A.C. 319, 328 (P.C.) (interpreting 
Bermuda’s constitution). 
282 See Hunter v. Southam, Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, 156 (Can.) (noting that 
“[The Charter] is intended to constrain governmental action inconsistent with 
those rights and freedoms; it is not in itself an authorization for governmental 
action”). 
283 Id. 
284 Id. at 156–57. 
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rights and freedoms and of judicial power and responsibility in 
relation to their protection,”285 and not as an affirmation of 
government authority. 
Twenty-five years into the Charter era, the Supreme Court of 
Canada has taken its original conception of citizen as rights 
holder,286 and thrown it into the Lake.  What has emerged is a 
deference-soaked jurisprudence, where the dominant 
consideration is not the judicial expertise in protecting rights but 
“the Minister’s superior expertise in relation to Canada’s 
international obligations and foreign affairs.”287  In characterizing 
the ministerial decision to extradite a citizen as parallel to the 
ministerial decision to deport a non-citizen,288 and in characterizing 
both processes as possessing “a negligible legal dimension,”289 the 
court drowned its own prior case law.  In the process, it engineered 
a complete international law reversal.  What surfaced in Lake was a 
Loch Ness monster of international relations and constitutional 
rights—not the sovereign law enforcing the rights of the national, 
but rather the sovereign state enforcing the interests of the nation.  
The law may not be cut-and-dry enough to say that this, or any 
such decision, is wrong, but the cases demonstrate that the legal 
logic of any one strand of the case law is necessarily all wet. 
4.2. Trafficking in Circles 
The case law reveals that when the United States calls for drug 
extraditions, the fugitives tend to come; or, more accurately, tend 
to be sent.  Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the facts of the 
Cotroni case itself.  As recounted by Justice La Forest, Frank 
Cotroni was a Canadian citizen, all of whose alleged criminal 
conduct took place without his ever having left Montreal.290  As 
 
285 R. v. Therens, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613, 638 (Can.) (Le Dain, J., dissenting). 
286 In early Charter jurisprudence, rights holders encompassed an expanded 
class of citizens, immigrants, and prospective immigrants who encounter state 
power.  See Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (Can.) 
(discussing the rights of residents); Re Singh and Minister of Employment and 
Immigration, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 (Can.) (discussing the rights of refugee 
claimants). 
287 Lake, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 761, para. 36. 
288 Id. para. 38 (comparing extradition of citizens to deportation of refugees). 
289 See Suresh v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, 
para. 39 (Can.). 
290 For a description of the background facts, see Cotroni, [1989] 1 S.C.R., 
paras. 2–11.  On Frank Cotroni’s life and times, see Reputed Montreal Crime Boss 
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already indicated, the crux of the defense surrounded the assertion 
that this factual link to Canada reflected the concrete legal link 
“between a citizen and his country.”291  This constitutional bond of 
citizen to state found favor in Justice Wilson’s dissent in Cotroni, 
where it was suggested that the entire affair be dismissed as a 
product of the excessively long reach of U.S. law enforcement.292 
On the other hand, the second sentence of Justice La Forest’s 
recitation of the facts, which stressed that the fugitive was sought 
by the United States “on a charge in that country of conspiracy to 
possess and distribute heroin,”293 went a long way toward 
terminating the asserted right to remain in Canada.  There was 
something about identifying the substantive issue as a drug 
extradition that placed the fugitive in a category of near 
statelessness.294  Since the early 1970s, with the House of Lords’ 
specific assertion that “crime is an international problem—perhaps 
not least crimes connected with the illicit drug traffic,”295 narcotics 
offenses have taken on a character that overrides other domestic 
legal concerns.  While in the ordinary course criminal law may be 
grounded in the local community vindicating itself through 
prosecution of the crime,296 drug trafficking has detached itself 
from any such local roots to become a universal legal issue.297  The 
“interests of society”, reasoned Justice La Forest, are found in cases 
such as Cotroni insofar as they aspire to the most universal of legal 
 
Cotroni Dead, CBC NEWS, Apr. 17, 2004, available at http://www.cbc.ca/canada 
/story/2004/08/17/cotroni_montreal040817.html (discussing the life and death 
of Frank Cotroni). 
291 See Cotroni, [1989] 1 S.C.R., para. 16. 
292 Id. para. 68 (holding that the defendant could have been prosecuted under 
Canadian criminal laws). 
293 Id. para. 67. 
294 For a description to the literal statelessness of international drug 
traffickers, see United States v. Caicedo, 47 F.3d 370, 372–73 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(resulting in an arrest for traffickers on high seas in flagless ship). 
295 See Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions v. Doot, [1973] A.C. 807, 834 (H.L.). 
296 See Bd. of Trade v. Owen, [1957] A.C. 602, 611 (explaining that conspiracy 
in England to commit offense abroad is not subject to English prosecutorial 
jurisdiction); Treacy v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, [1971] A.C. 537, 540 (explaining 
how jurors are drawn from county in which alleged offense occurred). 
297 See Liangsiriprasert v. United States, [1991] 92 Cr. App. R. 77, 78 (P.C.) 
(explaining that an agreement abroad to traffic in heroin is triable in England if 
the parties were intended to result in criminal acts in England).  See also Doot, 
[1973] A.C., at 831 (describing how drug trafficking triable in England despite the 
fact that offence is “more likely to ruin young lives in the United States of America 
than in this country . . .”). 
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ideals: “to discover the truth in respect of the charges brought 
against the accused.”298 
Drugs have reintroduced the national to the sovereign nation, 
removing the protections afforded by a sovereign law.  The 
American insistence on policing the worlds of narcotics trade,299 
and the changes wrought by that insistence on the character of 
global society,300 has had this transformative effect on extradition 
policy around the world.301  Although the “war on drugs” has been 
a failure if measured by the goal of eradication it has set for 
itself,302 it has had remarkable impact on judicial opinions among 
neighbors and allies of the United States.  In particular, the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s interpretation of the Charter of Rights, 
which has become the role model of choice, 303 has been influenced 
in a way which seems diametrically opposed to its own 
interpretive tradition.304 
 
298 Cotroni, [1989] 1 S.C.R., para. 30. 
299 See Ethan Nadelmann, Commonsense Drug Policy, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 111, 112 
(1998) (describing drug policy as an aspect of U.S. foreign policy). 
300 See Ethan Nadelmann, Challenging the Global Prohibition Regime, 9 INT’L J. 
DRUG POL’Y 85, 93 (1998) (observing that developments in drug policy impact 
global society). 
301 The transformative effect, of course, could be perceived as either positive 
or negative.  Compare Ethan Nadelmann, Ending the War on Drugs, LAPIS MAG. 
(2001), available at http://www.drugpolicy.org/library/nadelmann_lapis2.cfm 
(labeling the war on drugs an “international disgrace”), with Lori Scott Fogelman, 
DEA Director Discusses War on Drugs, Public Service Careers, BAYLOR U. NEWS, Sept. 
17, 2002, http://www.baylor.edu/pr/news.php?action=story&story=4196 
(“There is some pleasant news.  On the demand side, we’ve reduced casual use, 
chronic use and prevented others from even starting.”). 
302 See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 
(resolving to prevent the use, manufacturing, and distribution of illegal drugs).  
For President Ronald Reagan’s remarks on signing the Bill into law, see President 
Ronald Reagan, Remarks on Signing the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, (Nov. 18, 
1988), (transcript available at http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/ 
speeches/1988/111888c.htm).  See also Proclamation No. 6053, 25 Weekly Comp. 
Pres. Doc. 1594, (Oct. 24, 1989), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu 
/ws/index.php?pid=1771 (President George H.W. Bush’s proclamation 
establishing Red Ribbon Week). 
303 Weinrib, supra note 258, at 85 (“[t]he Canadian Charter offers a more 
attractive system of rights protection than, for example, its American 
counterpart.”).  The phenomenon is new for courts, but not necessarily for legal 
scholars.  See, e.g., W. Ivor Jennings, Note, Constitutional Interpretation: The 
Experience of Canada, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1, 39 (1937) (arguing that “judges can 
interpret a fairly closely-defined Constitution according to the principles of 
Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence.”). 
304 See Christopher Bird,  Lake v. Canada (Minister of Justice)—Reaffirming 
Judicial Deference to Cabinet Decisionmaking, THE COURT, May 22, 2008, available at 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss2/2
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As a product of international law thinking,305 however, the 
Canadian Charter was already prone to the reversals that the drug 
extradition cases have brought out.  Although it is most often 
thought that the introduction of international legal ideas helped 
the constitutional rights holder put a break on state power,306 it is 
also international law, incorporated into the Constitution, that 
historically declared the sovereign government to have “plenary 
powers of legislation”307 and unrestrained authority.308  
Accordingly, the Knowles court wondered into Mellino’s holding 
that the Constitution doesn’t apply to foreign relations and 
extraditions, the Rosenstein court discovered Cotroni’s 
“progressive” vision of cooperative law enforcement as a 
constitutional norm, and the Lake court stumbled into the idea of 
government itself as constitutional decision-maker, all without 
 
http://www.thecourt.ca/2008/05/22/lake-v-canada-minister-of-justice                            
-reaffirming-judicial-deference-to-federal-decisionmaking/ (describing the 
precedent set by Lake for the appropriate standard of care required of the Minister 
of Justice in an extradition case). 
305 See generally ANNE F. BAYEFSKY,  INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: USE 
IN CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS LITIGATION 5 (1992) (addressing 
how “rules governing the relationship of international law to domestic or 
municipal law are attempts to reconcile a variety of policies . . .”); WILLIAM A. 
SCHABAS, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND THE CANADIAN CHARTER: A 
MANUAL FOR THE PRACTITIONER 11 (1991) (“The rich influence of international 
sources in the final version of the Canadian Charter is uncontested.”) (citation 
omitted). 
306 See Lorraine Weinrib, A Primer on International Law and the Canadian 
Charter, 21 NAT’L J. CONST. L., 313 (2007). 
307 Croft v. Dunphy, [1932] 59 C.C.C. 141, 144 (P.C.); Statute of Westminster, 
1931, 22 Geo. 5, c. 4, § 4 (Eng.) (discussing the extra-territorial operation of 
Dominion laws); see also Reference re Resolution to Amend the Constitution 
(Patriation Reference), [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753, 831 (“The history of constitutional 
amendments also parallels the development of Canadian sovereignty.”).  For a 
contemporary restatement of this proposition and a review of the sources on 
which it is based, see R. (Bancoult) v. Secretary of State, [2008] UKHL 61 (U.K.) 
(stating that “international law, forming no part of domestic law, could not 
support any argument for the invalidity of a purely domestic law . . . .”). 
308 See A.-G. N.S. v. A.-G. Can. (Nova Scotia Interdelegation Case), [1950] 4 
D.L.R. 369, 371 (S.C.C.) (“The Parliament of Canada and the Legislatures of the 
several Provinces are sovereign within their sphere defined by the BNA Act. . . .”).   
See also VERNON BOGDANOR, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESSAYS ON BRITISH 
GOVERNMENT 5 (1996) (“What the Queen in Parliament enacts is law.”).  For 
British dominions more generally, see JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF 
PARLIAMENT: HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY 1 (1999) (“[W]hen the Imperial Parliament 
granted power to colonial legislatures to make laws for the ‘peace, welfare and 
good government’ of their colonies, it granted them power of the same nature, as 
plenary and absolute, as its own power.”) (citation omitted). 
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straying far from a well worn path.  Surprising as they may seem, 
each holding is also par for the circuitous course. 
The citizen as subject of the nation and the nation as subject of 
the law have always shared international legal space as alternative 
realities.  Judicial perspective may be such that each has frequently 
been hidden from the other,309 but both visions co-exist in the legal 
system.  It is this co-existence of incompatible ideas that has 
allowed rights talk to fall back on law enforcement, and the 
Constitution to merge with international relations.310 
The basic norm of the constitutional order can be seen as either 
the restricted state or the empowered state,311 while the basic norm 
of the international order can be seen as either the unrestrained 
sovereign or the submerged sovereign within a system larger than 
itself.312  Either way, where the two come together, as in extradition 
law, the basic norms are relative and dependent on perspective.313  
 
309 See PAUL DE MAN, BLINDNESS AND INSIGHT 103 (1971) (discussing 
contradictions in literary language and how “the one always lay hidden within 
the other as the sun lies hidden within a shadow, or truth within error.”). 
310 For a general theoretical explanation of this possibility and its relationship 
to linear logic, see Hector C. Sabelli, et. al., Anger, Fear, Depression, and Crime: 
Physiological and Psychological Studies Using the Process Method, in ROBIN ROBERTSON 
& ALLAN COMBS, CHAOS THEORY IN PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LIFE SCIENCES 65, 67 (1995) 
(“Opposite actions, each asymmetric, complement each other to create partial 
symmetries, such as cycles, folds, and structures, rather than neutralizing each 
other in formless equilibrium.”). 
311 This harks back to Chief Justice Marshall’s view of popular sovereignty, 
whereby constitutional power flows up from the founders of the Constitution 
who define the specific powers of government.  See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 
U.S. 316, 326 (1819) (trumpeting sovereignty of the people in constitutional 
assembly over sovereignty of the several states).  For the relationship of 
Marshall’s take on popular sovereignty to international law, see Edward M. 
Morgan, Internalization of Customary International Law: An Historical Perspective, 12 
YALE J. INT’L L. 63, 65 (1987), discussing Chief Justice Marshall’s assertion of the 
power of the judiciary over the executive for purposes of internalization. 
312 This harks back to Lord Atkin’s view of state sovereignty, whereby 
constitutional power flows down from the Crown at the pinnacle of the 
constitutional order.  See A.-G. Can. v. A.-G. Ontario (Labour Conventions Case), 
[1937] A.C. 326 (P.C.) (discussing the ratification of treaty in British and Canadian 
constitutional law entails executive act or Royal assent).  For the relationship of 
the Privy Council’s take on state sovereignty to international law, see Edward M. 
Morgan, Criminal Process, International Law, and Extraterritorial Crime, 38 U. 
TORONTO L. J. 245, 249 (1988), explaining that the Privy Council believed 
international law derived from state sovereignty because states consented to 
restrictions on their freedoms. 
313 See KELSEN, supra note 69, at 368 (stating that basic norms of state 
formation are a matter of perspective and can be judged only in a relative sense 
from either constitutional law or international law). 
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One is almost tempted to say that “subjects which in one aspect 
and for one purpose fall within [individual rights], may in another 
aspect and for another purpose fall within [international 
cooperation].”314  American pressure to traffic in fugitive traffickers 
may have pushed for a change in legal direction,315 but the circular 









314 See Hodge v. The Queen, [1883] 9 A.C. 117, 130 (P.C.) (addressing the 
double aspect doctrine for interpreting the British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 
31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.): “[s]ubjects which in one aspect and for one purpose fall within 
sect. 92, may in another aspect and for another purpose fall within sect. 91”). 
315 On the tilt toward law enforcement objectives generally spawned by the 
international “war on drugs,” see Ethan A. Nadelmann, Global Prohibition Regimes: 
The Evolution of Norms in International Society, 44 INT’L ORG. 479, 526 (1990) 
(discussing how developments in drug testing and the drugs themselves will 
change the drug enforcement regime).  On the link to foreign policy and 
international security, see David Bewley-Taylor and Martin Jelsma, The 
Internalization of the War on Drugs: Illicit Drugs as Moral Evil and Useful Enemy, in 
SELLING US WARS 270 (2007), examining the war on drugs and its damaging 
impact on U.S. relations with many other countries in the world. 
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